The New Republic posted my post-trip article on the Sudanese elections that will begin on Sunday.

Already Stolen

A visit to Sudan makes clear: The election is going to be a sham.

In February, as part of a delegation from the Save Darfur Coalition, I met Mustafa Ismail in Khartoum. Ismail is the country’s former foreign minister and current presidential adviser to President Omar Al Bashir. He thanked us for our “timely visit,” then proceeded to speak almost uninterrupted for close to an hour about the Sudanese regime’s new commitment to democracy, peace, and development. To that end, he urged the international community to endorse the country’s upcoming nationwide elections and stop “inflaming” the situation in Sudan with false accusations.

Now, with the Sudanese vote set to begin this weekend, the Obama administration seems to be doing exactly what Ismail had wanted. Last month, Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, said that “significant preparations have been made to ensure that the elections will really reflect the will of the people” (although he added that there were “logistical challenges” still to resolve). Then, last weekend—after the presidential candidate of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the major party that represents southern Sudan, withdrew from the race, citing the prospect of massive fraud and intimidation—Gration said that members of Sudan’s electoral commission had “given [him] confidence that the elections … would be as free and as fair as possible,” adding that they “have gone to great lengths to ensure that the people of Sudan will have access to polling places and that the procedures and processes will ensure transparency.”

Gration’s optimism is baffling. As I learned during my recent four-week trip to Sudan—when I visited Khartoum, the southern part of the country, and Darfur—there is no chance that these elections will be even remotely free or fair. (Read the rest here)

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The post-trip writing continues.  I posted this piece today at Change.org.

Protection, Trust and UNAMID in Darfur

“We need active forces, not UNAMID. They are a tourism army,” declared a leader of an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in West Darfur. He expressed in these words the frustrations of many Darfuris whom I met during a recent week spent travelling in Darfur. Another former state minister complained that the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force (UNAMID) was “only good at writing reports in their air-conditioned offices.” With news that violence was flaring in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur and that UNAMID lacked the full authority to investigate the reports of civilian causalities and mass displacement there, these complaints certainly resonated.

Such blame, while understandable, should not be directed at those courageously serving or leading UNAMID. The Sudanese government and Darfuri rebel movements continue to prevent UNAMID from fully carrying out its mandate. The UN Security Council sent UNAMID to keep a peace that did not exist – a common refrain from those associated with the mission. In practice, this reality means that UNAMID can only carry out its Chapter 7 mandate and other duties to protect civilians with the consent of the Sudanese government. Only after you have sat in a UNAMID convoy as it passed through a Sudanese Armed Forces checkpoint do you understand the inherent restrictions on the mission.

Read the rest at Change.org

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Since I returned from Sudan, I have been busy writing. Here is a piece I posted today at Foreign Policy’s new Middle East Channel.

What the Islamic Conference got wrong on Darfur

Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) pledged $850 million dollars for future development in Darfur on Sunday in Cairo. Egypt and Turkey co-chaired the donor’s conference–which aimed to jumpstart international commitment to long-term reconstruction and development in Darfur after seven years of conflict, mass displacement, and humanitarian crisis. Some countries making generous pledges willfully ignored the ongoing security challenges and unresolved conflict between the Darfuri rebels and the Sudanese government. In this way, the OIC–like the League of Arab States in its response to the Darfur crisis–sought to help the people of Darfur without addressing those most responsible for their deplorable conditions.

Read the rest at Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel

And here is a piece on the Darfur peace process that I posted at Huffington Post.

Darfuri Civil Society: Still Missing from the Table

“This step constitutes a strong and vital addition to efforts to bring peace in Darfur,” declared Sudan’s Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha in Doha yesterday, after signing a framework agreement with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). That may be true, but as I wrote last week, peace in Darfur remains a long way off.

Read the rest at Huffington Post

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Abou Shouk Camp, near El-Fasher (Save Darfur/Mark Lotwis)

First posted at Save Darfur…

A month ago in one of my first meetings in Khartoum, I sat through an extended lecture from Dr. Hasabu Abdel-Rahman, the Humanitarian Aid Commissioner.  For more than an hour, he extolled the ability of the Sudanese state to provide for the millions of displaced in Darfur and sharply critiqued the international humanitarian assistance efforts.  It was his opinion that Darfur is well on its way to a full recovery. He shot out statistic after statistic to make his case, including that over 1.2 million Darfuris had returned home from 2007 to 2009 – a number flatly denied by numerous sources during the rest of our trip.

Dr. Hasabu also wanted us to know that international NGOs lack appropriate transparency mechanisms . He complained that while the Sudanese government is forced to sign numerous “treaties” and documents holding them accountable for international assistance that donors and NGOs act with few constraints.  His argument carried with it the implicit accusation that one of his employees made directly when we visited Abou Shouk camp outside of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.  This man argued with a straight face that 80% of the budget of INGOs goes to administrative costs and only 20% go to services for the people. He said that these organizations are making millions off of the suffering in Darfur.

Therefore, I found it highly ironic yesterday when I read a story in the Sudan Tribune about Dr. Hasabu:

The Sudanese cabinet issued an unannounced decision to investigate the disappearance of 10 billion pounds from the ministry of humanitarian affairs, a newspaper reported today.

The Akhir-Lahza newspaper said that the council of Ministers wants a probe into the performance of the ministry and the relationship between the minister and the state minister.

Furthermore the report indicated that the humanitarian aid commissioner Hasabu Abdel-Rahman has been relieved from his duties but did not say when the decision was taken. The Sudanese official is running for parliamentary elections and is therefore prohibited from keeping his position at the ministry.

The newspaper quoted reliable sources saying that issue is an outcome of what it called the chaos in decision-making within the ministry and spoke unaccounted funds including eight billion pounds earmarked for the emergency program, two billion pounds for humanitarian action.

I hope Dr. Hasabu takes care in his own involuntary return.

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Just posted this piece at Foreign Policy’s new Middle East Channel.

Peace in Darfur: still a long way off

It is too early to tell – but the “framework agreement” recently signed between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the most effective armed rebel movement in Darfur, offers some hope for peace in Darfur. The commitment to an immediate ceasefire and reaching a final accord by March 15 advances the dialogue further than at any point since May 2006 – when President Omar al-Bashir’s government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with what was then considered the strongest of the movements. The problems with that agreement are the same as those threatening the current talks: the fragmentation of the movements and questions about the sincerity of the Sudanese government.

Read the rest here.

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First posted at Save Darfur’s blog…

My colleagues Jerry Fowler and Mark Lotwis left Sudan last Friday heading back to Washington.  In order to set up a few more meetings in the South, I stayed on in Juba. Little did we know President Omar al-Bashir and his entourage of advisors and security agents would be coming to town—and staying in the same modest hotel as the Save Darfur delegation, in the very wing where Jerry had been sleeping.

Over the weekend, I had heard that Bashir would be traveling to Juba and a few other towns in the South to campaign.  In my mind, I imagined a quick dash by motorcade from the airport to a rally in Juba and then a few darts by plane to some other choice locations in the Greater Equatoria states.

So I was quite surprised when early Monday afternoon, I was confronted by a newly erected roadblock in front of my hotel.  Initially, the mix of police and security officials told me that I could not pass. When I explained that I was staying at the hotel beyond their checkpoint, they quickly scanned my backpack and then gave me strict instructions on how to walk to the next crowd of security personnel suddenly stationed in front of hotel gate.  After another round of negotiations that involved coaxing hotel staff out to verify my claims, I was finally permitted to enter the foyer—where I was promptly urged by a security guard to take my room key and, like a misbehaving child, go straight to my room.

Read the rest of this entry

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My favorite story in the Sudanese press yesterday came from Al Ray Al Aam. The headline read: “Egypt: the relationship between al-Bashir and Mubarak is stronger than it’s perceived by enemies.”

This scoop came from Safwat El-Sherif, the Secretary General of Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and the Chairman of the Egyptian Shura Council. El-Sherif made these comments to a delegation of visiting Sudanese journalists in Cairo. He also stressed that Egypt views Sudan as its “strategic depth” and, as such, the country will spare no efforts to keep Sudan unified, strong, safe and secure.

What does this mean concerning Egypt’s response to a vote for southern secession in 2011? Well, probably not much, since first El-Sherif does not really make foreign policy and second Egypt has been sending mixed signals for months. At times, officials have said they would support southern independence and at other times they have hedged on such support. The debate about what to do in Cairo is likely still ongoing, given its importance to Egyptian national security.

However, El-Sherif’s interesting justification for a unified Sudan was only matched by his description of the wall that Egypt is building on its border with Gaza and his explanation of the current press freedoms in Egypt.

On unity: A generation was brought up on a love for Sudan and the unity of the Nile Valley. Such a generation believes in the unity of the Nile Valley and went out into the streets for it.

  • In fact, Sudanese chose independence in 1956. Sudanese leaders have often criticized Egypt’s intrusive  foreign policy that seems to forget often this historical and political reality.

On Palestine: There is no wall of steel, but actions of the armed forces to protect Egypt’s national security…We are free to choose the way we protect our national security.

  • In fact, the wall is made of super-strength steel says the BBC and Egypt has been complicit with Israel in the humanitarian blockade of Gaza.

On Freedoms: Egypt is experiencing unprecedented levels of freedom of opinion and expression, and it has allowed freedoms unprecedented in other Arab countries.


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Check out a piece that I just posted at Huffington Post…

“Bashir’s Pre-Election Victory Lap at the Scene of the Crime”

Can you imagine Slobodan Milosevic running for president in Srebrenica? The world would have been justifiably outraged. Yesterday, however, indicted war criminal Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir visited El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. While not an official campaign appearance, the trip comes three days after Bashir received the formal presidential nomination of his party in the upcoming elections in April. It is long past due for the world – and particularly the United States – to express its grave concern about the sham electoral process that in a few months could effectively legitimize Bashir’s repressive government. Read the rest here.

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Rebels in eastern Chad (Photo: Reuters)

First posted at Save Darfur…

Is there an end coming to the Sudan/Chad proxy war? Perhaps, and that may be a good thing in the long run, but in the short run the people of North Darfur are bearing the brunt of changing calculations by the ruling regimes in Khartoum and N’djamena. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) last week issued an urgent warning about attacks on civilians by the Chadian opposition forces operating in North Darfur. These troubling developments may be in response to the much rumored rapprochement between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Chadian President Idris Deby.

A Sudanese delegation last week traveled to N’djamena, Chad, to continue bilateral discussions on ending the proxy war between the two countries. These talks­­—which began in October­—allegedly aim to create a “framework for joint patrols on their shared borders” and to normalize diplomatic relations. The United States has welcomed the dialogue as “a key element in advancing the Darfur Peace Process.” This reading is dead-on. Just as important though, the international community and the United States must offer support for the implementation of commitments made by both Chad and Sudan, while at the same time speaking out about any human rights abuses committed by all armed forces in the region.

The Small Arms Survey provides a helpful background to the tensions and hostilities between Sudan and Chad:

Throughout the 1990s Déby was a loyal ally of the regime in Sudan. He consistently refused to supply aid to Sudanese rebels—whether from Darfur or South Sudan—despite requests to do so since the early 1990s. But from 2003 he was unable to stop the two rebel movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his regime) and garnering support among the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government.

…Déby’s inability to prevent those close to him from supporting the Darfur rebels weakened his credibility among power-brokers in Khartoum. In response, starting in 2003, Khartoum incorporated Darfur based Chadian opposition elements into the janjawid…When these groups were not fighting alongside the Sudanese army in Darfur, they launched periodic attacks on Chadian territory.

In 2004 Khartoum started asking the numerous rebel Chadian factions to unite. From 2005, Déby began a rapprochement with Darfur rebel groups (SLA–Minni Minnawi and JEM), in exchange for their commitment to aid in fighting Chadian rebels on Chadian soil. The situation deteriorated rapidly .An attack on the border down of Adré on 18 December 2005 by the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés (RDL), a Chadian rebel movement made up of Tama led by Captain Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, marked a turning point. Déby now realised that Sudan was decisively supporting Chadian rebels against him. While the rebels did not manage to take Adré, the raid allowed Mahamat Nour to display his strength and later assume the leadership of the Sudan-supported rebel coalition, the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC). From this point onwards Déby actively supported the Darfur rebels.

In the last two years, this proxy war has included rebel offensives on both capitals. Two months ago, the UN Panel of Exports Report identified the Sudan/Chad hostilities as a key component of the Darfur ongoing crisis, noting that they serve as a chief “impediment to the political process that also has a negative impact on the settlement of the conflicts between Chad and the Chadian armed opposition groups and between the Sudan and JEM.” In the last month, in fact, Chadian President Idris Deby has both bombed rebel forces and offered to make peace with them.

Read the rest of this entry

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This is the third part of my review of Mahmood Mamdani’s Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (links to Part I and Part II)The review was published in the latest issue of The SAIS Review of International Affairs. To download the PDF copy with full footnotes, click here.

Stripping Agency of Victims

On his mission to teach Save Darfur a lesson, Mamdani himself ignores critical elements of the violence in Darfur, and in the process, strips the victims and perpetrators of their political agency. (Similar charges have been leveled at Mamdani’s treatment of the Rwandan genocide in When Victims Become Killers.) Mamdani is right to highlight the historical and political realities that led to the most recent outbreak of fighting in Darfur at the beginning of this decade. Save Darfur and others in the movement have been guilty at times of simplifying the nature of the conflict in order to attract and retain supporters. Indeed, Save Darfur shares this fault with advocacy organizations working on a whole host of other domestic and international issues, all of which vie for the same media space. Mamdani is right to point out the problematic consequences of such simplification. But Mamdani is wrong to use such instances to reason away the catastrophic violence and its impact on Darfuri society. Unable to delink his frustration with uninformed American liberal (or neo-conservative) interventionism from his analysis of facts on the ground, his book attacks the victims of violence for distrusting a brutal regime in Khartoum and seeking external assistance from the international community. To that end, he demeans Darfuris living in IDP and refugee camps as “consumers” who have abdicated their responsibility as “citizens” and committed all their hopes for salvation to humanitarian intervention.

Is this the same callous advice Mamdani would give to displaced civilians in Sri Lanka caught between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan military, or to innocent Palestinians in Gaza caught between the violence of Hamas and Israel? To be sure, it is true that there exists genuine concern about the dependency psychology that may well be growing within a number of war-affected Darfuri communities. But these facts notwithstanding, Mamdani shows no willingness to explicate the political limitations of the 4.7 million Darfuris still affected by the violence of the last six years. Reading Mamdani, the Darfur and Sudan of the last twenty years appear like an oasis of freedom of expression, association, and political mobilization. Nothing could be further from the truth, as noted by Alex de Waal in his critique of Saviors and Survivors. Having endured an oppressive military regime since 1989 and then a campaign of ethnic cleansing, it is not surprising that Darfuris have struggled to unify under various rebel movements or to put forward a civil society alternative today. The last serious peace talks between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government revealed a glaring gap in the capacity of Darfuri groups to even state their collective demands clearly and to negotiate effectively. Since the failed Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006, the vicious cycle of rebel fragmentation has only made the voices of the average Darfuri even more difficult to discern. One must remember that facing similar human capacity challenges and the divide-and-conquer tactics of Khartoum, the rebels in South Sudan remained internally divided for years before unifying around the leadership and vision of John Garang.

Having so easily dismissed the concerns of three million displaced Darfuris by labeling them “consumers” as opposed to responsible “citizens,” it is natural that Mamdani can find no moral or political role for an advocacy organization like Save Darfur that works to amplify these concerns. To be fair, the advocacy movement must acknowledge that is has been slow to recognize its influence over the decision-making of Darfuri rebels who assume that the advocacy movement will remain quiet about their negotiating intransigence and human rights abuses in Darfur and neighboring Chad. With that said, though, some of the most useful efforts of the more mature Save Darfur Coalition have sought to provide platforms to Darfuris to tell their own stories and to provide time and space for Darfuris in the diaspora and civil society to articulate their concerns in future negotiations with the Sudanese government. The coalition funds and supports, for example, various efforts to engage these leaders in the peace process, given that both the Sudanese government and the personal ambitions and ideologies of Darfuri rebel leaders have stripped average Darfuri citizens of these opportunities. Not only does Mamdani fail to engage this part of Save Darfur’s work, he fails to acknowledge the importance of empowering victims in Darfur who are pitted in an asymmetrical set of negotiations about their futures with the politically astute Sudanese government.

In fact, based on Mamdani’s writings, it is an open question as to whether he has greater animus for the policies of the Bush administration or the grassroots mobilizing tools of the Save Darfur Coalition, which he regards as the “humanitarian face of the War on Terror.” Such outlandish claims demonstrate the shallowness of Mamdani’s research of Save Darfur. All of his quotes detailing the supposed race-based tactics and neo-imperial objectives of Save Darfur come from activists, journalists, or celebrities who are not formally linked to the organization. The book lacks reference to even a single interview with any members of the Save Darfur Coalition or its close partners. As the above narrative of the coalition’s emergence eludes, such interviews would have revealed a more interesting history of an organization that ultimately recognized its policy deficiencies and attempted to fill them with highly knowledgeable and experienced Sudanese and American policy makers and human rights defenders.

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