The New York Times reports that at least 14 radio stations in Mogadishu stopped broadcasting music on Tuesday, “heeding an ultimatum by an Islamist insurgent group to stop playing songs or face ’serious consequences.’”

Because of these threats from Hizb Islam, the director of one of the radio stations said:

We have replaced the music of the early morning program with the sound of the rooster, replaced the news music with the sound of the firing bullet and the music of the night program with the sound of running horses…It was really a crush. We haven’t had time to replace all the programs at one time; instead, we have chosen these sounds.

In solidarity with the people of Somalia and music lovers there especially, I thought it would be an appropriate time to highlight Somali rap phenomenon, K’naan.  The powerful lyrics from his song entitled “Somalia” help paint the painful, oftentimes grotesque, and heroic stories of his people:

This is where the streets have no name and the drain of sewage

You can see it in the boy how the hate is brewin’

‘Cause when his tummy tucks in, fuck, the pain is fluid

So what difference does it make entertaining, threw it

Some getting high mixing coke and gun powder, sniffin’

She got a gun, but could have been a model or physician

Have a listen…

Cross-posted at Poets and Policymakers…

Maps: A novel by Nurrudin Farah begins with a quote by Charles Dickens: “No children for me. Give me grown-ups.” Farah indeed depicts his main character, Askar, as a precocious child beyond his years and the novel tracks his struggles in identity from birth to near adulthood. Misra accompanies Askar, an ethnic Somali born in the Ogaden (eastern Ethiopia) on most of this developmental journey. She is his Ethiopian adopted mother and soul mate – an identity that engenders conflict given that the novel takes place in the late 1970s.

In the summer of 1977, the power of nationalism propelled Somalia and Ethiopia into the Ogaden War. By this point, Ethiopia had lost control of the Ogaden to an insurgency and there was clear evidence that the Somalis were supporting the rebel movements. This assistance, once the war began, climbed to upwards of 75,000 Somali troops supported by tanks. Somalis overwhelmingly supported this invasion of eastern Ethiopia.

Calculating the worth of their two alliances, the Soviet Union broke off relations with Somalia in the fall of 1977 and upped their arms sales to the Ethiopians. Ultimately the Ethiopians pushed the Somali forces to withdraw completely from the Ogaden. In the end, over 25,000 Somalis died in the war, as well as thousands of Ethiopians. The failed campaign fought in the name of Somali nationalism also brought humiliation to the Siad Barre regime as roughly 700,000 refugees from the Ogaden flooded across the border into Somalia – creating a humanitarian crisis.

In the novel, Askar is sent to Mogadishu from a small village in the Ogaden at the height of the war to stay with a well-educated uncle and aunt. Misra stays behind, only to be accused within a year of betraying the village to the Ethiopian army, elements of which carry out a brutal massacre of many of her fellow villagers. She ultimately flees and finds her way to Mogadishu a decade later. Before her sudden arrival, Askar and his new family are informed of the alleged betrayal. And, thus, Askar is forced to manage his loyalties and love to Somalia with his intense connection to the woman that raised him.

Askar’s fascination with maps provides a way for him and the author to explore the character’s identity through the ravages of Ogaden War, as well as the colonial past that set the boundaries and the ever-present national aspirations of the Somali people. The basic question asked repeatedly by Misra and Askar is: who are my people? And what are my responsibilities to them, especially in the face of multiple loyalties? The novel reveals that the answers for people with complex relationships are never as clear as the boundaries fought over by the belligerents.

These painful questions likely endure for the people of the Ogaden as a low-level insurgency continues against the Ethiopian government, which now blames the Eritrean government of providing support to the rebels. In addition, immediate irredentist claims on the Ogaden by some members of the Islamic Courts Union that took power in Mogadishu in 2006 helped provoke Ethiopia to invade Somalia later that year. The Ethiopians quickly removed the Islamists from power – but in the process ushered in three chaotic years of displacement and bloodshed in Somalia.

Like Dickens, Farah undoubtedly would also prefer grown-ups rather than children to demonstrate the horrors of his age. Yet in choosing children, he faces the cruel realities directly. In Somalia today, in fact, the United Nations reports about half of Somalia’s population of seven million is in a state of humanitarian emergency. And, half of those are children. An official stated last month:“There is no child in central south Somalia who knows what it is to live in peace. And to now try to recover from that as communities and society, of course, will take at least a generation.”

Farah also in the midst of the darkness though offers hope through the story of Askar as well as many of his other characters. For those who may hear Somalia and just shake their heads to forget or to despair of the situation, here is a great excerpt from an interview in 2007 in which he explains his motivations and intentions of his fiction:

NURUDDIN FARAH: …I have tried my best to keep my country alive by writing about it, and the reason is because nothing good comes out of a country until the artists of that country turn to writing about it in a truthful way.

JEFFREY BROWN: You mean, this is the role of an artist, the role of a writer.

NURUDDIN FARAH: This is the role of the artist, the role of the artist who also is, well, shall we say, probably courageous, probably mad, probably terribly ambitious writer, who wants to say, “This is what Somalia is like, and this is what I’m going to write.”

It is possible that the way I see Somalia is not the way that some other Somalis or some other foreigners who do not know Somalia may see it that way. But I have continually seen Somalia as a country full of hope, and yet that are being held back from, you know, accomplishing that hope, that dream.

To end, such words remind me of those arguing for constructive disengagement from Somalia by the international community. The idea is to free Somalis as much as possible from the distortions and obstacles inherent in foreign interference. It would only be then, they argue, that Somalis could face other challenges like that of clan politics and local and national governance openly and honestly. Unfortunately, for many reasons (some good and some bad), the international community remains stuck in the failed status quo of Somalia which supposedly keeps the country from falling further into the abyss, but also prevents Somalis from fully seizing control of their futures.

Variations of this predicament exist in Afghanistan and Sudan. Looking forward to another post, Niloufer and I hope to write more on the topic soon.

Is it just me or have the number of Yemen “experts” in the United States increased exponentially in the last two weeks? Before the thwarted Christmas Day terrorist attack, if you wanted daily analysis on Yemen, the Waq al Waq blog was one of the only reliable sources. Now its hard to keep track of the self-proclaimed experts popping up on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC and across the media spectrum. Waq al Waq thankfully is now receiving the attention it deserves (they reported 3,000 hits today alone).

I am still scared, however, of the collective narrative being formed by all these other talking heads. Joe Lieberman led the way with the Yemen hysteria. Days after Christmas, he told Fox News: “Iraq was yesterday’s war, Afghanistan is today’s war. If we don’t act preemptively, Yemen will be tomorrow’s war.” Discussions about putting boots on the ground in Yemen, even if still very unlikely, are now appearing more and more frequently.

These “experts” though rarely mention the humanitarian crisis associated with the conflict in North Yemen between the Houthi rebels and the central government. Likewise, few commentators ever mention the human rights abuses committed by President Ali Abdallah Salih’s government – our partner in the war against Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula – in its efforts to silence dissent in South Yemen. Largely ignored, Human Rights Watch put out an extensive report on December 15, entitled “Yemen: End Harsh Repression in the South” that stated:

Based on over 80 interviews with victims in the southern Yemeni cities of Aden and Mukalla, the report finds that security forces used lethal force against unarmed demonstrators on at least six occasions. Over the past year the authorities arbitrarily arrested thousands of people for exercising their right to peaceful assembly, suspended independent media critical of government policies, and detained journalists and writers on spurious charges.

With an insurgency/counter-insurgency that has resulted in mass displacement of civilians and recurring secessionist problems, the interlocking crises in Yemen appear remarkably similar to those in Sudan and Somalia. The news coverage unfortunately in the American media on Yemen more closely resembles that of Somalia than Sudan. Al Qaeda and pirates make headlines; humanitarian crises, civilian casualties and displacement, root political causes, human rights, and gripping poverty are generally ignored or are of only peripheral interest.

As Greg at Waq al Waq writes:

The problem is not that Yemen was getting little attention – the problem is that Yemen only got attention when al-Qaeda was viewed as a threat in Yemen. The country received a great deal of attention in 2001, 2002 and 2003 but very little after that particularly in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. It was only in 2008 and 2009 when al-Qaeda was once again viewed as a threat by the US that aid to Yemen was increased once again. The lessons for the Yemeni government are clear.

Sudan, of course, is not in the headlines every day, nor is the coverage by the American media perfect. With that said, at least, when stories appear about Sudan, experts and journalists explore the human side of the conflicts and human rights abuses. This difference, no doubt, largely results from the presence of an active human rights advocacy movement for Darfur and Sudan in the United States. With the departure of Osman bin Laden from Sudan in the 1990s, the Al Qaeda threat from Sudan also became greatly diminished. So, while American foreign policy still aims to prevent Sudan from harboring terrorists, most of its attention can focus on other immediate challenges like ending the conflict in Darfur and preventing a return to war between North and South Sudan.

It is natural that Americans will care first and foremost about national security. The problem is that – despite the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which have turned into labyrinthine nation-building projects – there is still very little appreciation for the complex array of factors involved in denying Al Qaeda a safe haven in dangerous places around the world. As Marc Lynch writes, there is still an inherent instinct to want to respond immediately to threats and “do something” – even if the repercussions could make the task of defeating Al Qaeda in the long-run more difficult.

It is incredibly challenging though to make the political case to Americans that “doing less” (i.e. doing things slowly and smartly) in Yemen or Somalia could actually be the preferred option. One small step forward in making this case though would be for the American media to focus more on the daily struggles of average people in Yemen or Somalia and less on the opinions of the countless security experts who may not even know a Yemeni or Somali. This change will not happen by itself though. Instead, human rights organizations and concerned citizens need to develop mechanisms to highlight these stories. To that end, linkages would need to be formed with civil society groups in the country and the diaspora outside.

These are just some initial thoughts on the matter and, therefore, I would be very interested to hear what others think. For those who want to read some of the best analysis thus far on what to do about Yemen, here are some useful links:

• The New York Times: Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell
• Waq al Waq: What to do in Yemen: Five Basic Suggestions
• Joost Hiltermann: Yemen: Disorder on the Border
• Marc Lynch: Don’t Lose Perspective on Yemen
• Alex Thurston: Yemen, Somalia, and Al Qaeda

Yesterday, I highlighted the recommendations of Somali experts – notably Bronwyn E. Bruton and Ken Menkhaus – for how the United States should contribute to counter-terrorism, conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, economic development and state-building in Somalia.  Their pragmatic and cautious approaches argue against knee-jerk American responses to the real or perceived threats posed by al-Qaeda, the al-Shabab, and piracy.

Last spring at SAIS, I put together an extensive backgrounder on Somalia. The paper traces the  history of state formation in Somalia from the colonial period to the collapse of the state and its current crises. At the end, I provide a brief analysis of the current challenges to peace-making and state-building placed in their historical context – something missing from much of the current writings on Somalia. I must confess that much of my understanding of Somalia has been influenced by Menkhaus, my former advisor.  In reading Bruton great piece in Foreign Affairs, I also found that her recommendations closely match the findings that I developed. So if you are interested, enjoy…

Introduction

The five points on the star of the light-blue Somali flag proclaim a nation’s dream deferred. The predominantly nomadic Somalis met the era of nationalism and independence with high hopes. They and observers of the time saw a “well-defined geographic and ethnic unit…as a natural base for a sovereign state.” Ethiopia and the colonial powers, however, had different visions for the boundaries of a Somali state. Three points of the star – Djibouti, the Ogaden (in Ethiopia), and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya – were stripped from the Somalis before the official birth of the Somali nation. The subsequent experiments with democracy and ‘scientific socialism’ attempted to develop a modern state and in some ways rebuild a forcibly contracted national consciousness. These processes ultimately failed and led to the collapse of the state in 1991. What emerged in replace of the state were still uncongealed fragments of a dismembered nation. For external and internal reasons, Somali leaders until this day have not found a means to unite these disparate and usually warring pieces.

Final Analysis

Emerging from a dismembering birth at independence, Somali elites have constantly attempted to breed irredentist nationalism to legitimize their control of the state. The early politics of democracy challenged each government to push a hard line on securing the stripped Somali lands of French Somaliland, the Ethiopian Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier in Kenya; former dictator Siad Barre could not concede the right of self-determination for the Ogaden Somalis in the late 1970s; and most recently the Islamic Court Union (ICU) could not muzzle threats against Ethiopia long enough to consolidate and defend their military and political successes in 2006.

Why do the elites retreat to this expansionist Somali nationalism each time in the face of clearly stronger neighbors? The answer may be that little else has thus far shown a capacity to forge a national consciousness across the real economic and social cleavages of Somali society. In addition to clan divisions, the rural/urban divide has shaped Somali politics for centuries as seen in the ebb and flow of power between the coastland to the hinterland. In the beginning of his regime, Barre recognized the importance of improving the agricultural sector, but the implementation of ‘scientific socialism,’ a product mostly of cold war convenience, could not begin to address the growing gaps between urban and rural populations. Then in the 1980s, the regime used state resources to inflame cleavages between various Somali communities.  As such, there were no defenders of the state when it collapsed and, likewise, no foreign agents to blame as a means of rallying Somali nationalism to revive the state.

Islam presents a more indigenously suited alternative, as it can be easily conflated with Somali nationalism and has shown the ability to bridge both rural/urban and clan divisions. The slow rise of Islamic activism and the ascendancy of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) demonstrate its cross-cutting mobilizing utility in Somali politics. Nevertheless, the ICU eventually encountered the common problem of clan division, with certain groups effectively characterizing it as Hawiye-dominated. The success of Islamic activism in Mogadishu, however, pales in comparison to the regional solutions that have endured in Somaliland and to a lesser extent in Puntland.

What the success of the ICU and Somaliland have in common, however, is that they are at their base Somali-derived solutions that depart in some key way from current Western models of governance. Yet, these accomplishments have been virtually unacceptable from the point of view of regional and international powers. Ethiopia views both an Islamist-oriented government in Somalia and greater autonomy or independence in Somaliland as threats to its national security.International actors also obviously fear the rise of an Islamist government in Somalia and want to avoid the division of Somalia into smaller units for fear of the encouragement that such a development would give minority groups in other countries, especially Africa. Despite these internationally imposed constraints on state-building in Somalia, the international community paradoxically continues to demand a state from the warring parties.

If such is still the objective, the process of national reconciliation and state formation must derive from Somali-driven processes. As theorized by as diverse an array of scholars as Ibn Khaldun and Francis Fukuyuma, social cohesiveness (or capital) and trust are key components in the formation of society and the building of a state. By all measures, these bonds have broken down in Somalia today. As such, Somalis have relied almost exclusively on their familial connections. This outcome is a result of a state that intentionally destroyed cross-cutting societal linkages in the 1980s – a process that began during the period of colonial partition. International intervention has only inflamed differences more and done nothing to rebuild trust among Somali political actors. Still both Ken Menkhaus and Peter Little have written about the “malleability of interests” even within the clan system in Somali society. They point to the way that the clan system has adapted to “the changing demands of the international community as well as to the challenges of statelessness and pastoralism.”  Little provocatively asks, “Is it surprising then that Somali clans began to fracture and/or consolidate along sub-clan and lineage lines when external agencies worked within a clan idiom themselves?”

In order then to identify the true interests of each constituency and search for a workable compromise, it is necessary to remove the foreign influences as much as possible. The involvement of the United States, Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea, and even the United Nations are inherently distorting to Somali politics.  As such, Menkhaus encourages the new Obama administration to seek “[p]olicies which privilege Somali-driven processes, rely mainly on Somali interests and actors to drive outcomes, and respect Somali preferences.” Were Somalis able to take control of the process in this way, perhaps finally as Samatar advised in 1988 “moral and intellectual commitments from leading classes” could emerge to take charge of the state and the economy. Western countries though must realize that in the current Somali political climate some solutions – such as regionalism or elements of Islamist governance – may emerge. It must accept, therefore, these outcomes and then support the new-born Somali state in making the central government and its governing mechanisms mean more to the Somali people than a threatening source of predation.

Heavily armed men in Somalia

The United States Institute of Peace held a talk yesterday focusing on “International Engagement with Somalia.” Bronwyn E. Bruton of the Council on Foreign Relations and Abukar Arman, an independent policy analyst originally from Somalia, addressed the immensely complicated topic of how the United States and its international partners should approach the interlocking and enduring political, security, and humanitarian crises in Somalia.

In his remarks, Arman emphasized the need for a “paradigm shift” in policymaking by highlighting the colossal mistakes of recent American policies toward Somalia. While he gave general recommendations for a new blueprint, he failed to outline in a systematic way any real contours for this new approach.

Given the shortage of viable national leaders, bottom-up governance strategies might appear to be a solution to Somalia’s messy, perpetually shifting decentralized politics. For instance, the experience of the ICU, which brought unparalleled stability to an unruly Mogadishu almost overnight in 2006, is instructive…Such arrangements,although admittedly fragile, have emerged in the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The best of them depend on local, rather than international, resources to deliver economic growth and other concrete benefits to the public and respect relations among clan and religious leaders, business groups, and civil society

It’s not just Sudan…more on China in Africa: The New York Times highlights political implications of a Chinese scholarship program for Namibia’s elite; China and Senegal hope to enhance military cooperation; and at the Globalist, two authors convincingly argue that “China is currently pursuing oil resources in unstable countries without regard for the political risk entailed. While that might play well in the short- to medium-term, it could cost China dearly down the line.”

It’s not just China increasing influence in Africa: Saudi Arabia held the first meeting of the Saudi-East Africa Forum in Addis Ababa this week. Representatives from seven East African countries attended: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda.  A Saudi minister stated, “Saudi Arabia is committed to combating hunger, to provide support for the host country but also to generate exports. We are not to impose our needs above the needs of local population.” Sudan did not participate in the forum; however, the Saudi Development Fund announced this week that it was donating 15 million dollars for development and rehabilitation in Darfur.  The money will go to the “model villages” that the Arab League has pushed as an effort to help IDPs in Darfur return to normal lives.

Whither Yemen? Thats the title of a good blog summarizing the current challenges facing Yemen’s leadership.  It concludes that “the period ahead for Yemen is likely to be, to paraphrase Hobbes, ‘nasty and brutish.’” Another blog challenges the notion that Saudi Arabia’s recent intervention in Yemen’s conflict with the Houthi rebels could be good for the US because it will lead to the further militarization of the Gulf and a strong Sunni and Gulf alliance against Iranian encroachment throughout the Arab world. Ian Bremmer at Foreign Policy tends to agree that greater militarization and more proxy wars are usually not constructive anywhere and argues that a failed state next to the world’s largest oil exporter is reason enough for Americans to care about the conflict.

Updates on Ethiopia, Somalia, and Egypt: The Sahel Blog tries to get a handle on what’s happening in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and how it relates to the never-ending conflict in Somalia.  Meanwhile, the War and Peace blog reflects on the significance of the killing of a Somali judge, who “devoted his life not only to the rule of law but to the pursuit of justice according to the sometimes conflicting state, Islamic, and Somali customary law systems in an incredibly volatile political environment.”  And finally a former professor of mine, Jon Alterman, explains how “Gamal Mubarak has cast himself as an executive and not a dictator” and made the necessary connections with the security and intelligence bosses to secure power once Hosni hands him the reins of Egypt.

Sarah Palin versus the White House on Settlement Expansion: The White House stood up forcefully this week to further settlement expansions in the West Bank, while Sarah Palin ringingly and shockingly endorsed Israelis rights to build as many settlements as they wish anywhere (!) because – in her unbelievable words – “more and more Jewish people will be flocking to Israel in the days and weeks and months ahead.”

Other Tidbits: Rob Crilly quickly notes steep decline of Darfur coverage and asks, “How do we keep people interested in just another African disaster?”  From an organization concerned about those displaced in Darfur and other conflicts, Refugees International is taking the lead on “climate displacement” but tells us that “under international refugee law there can be no “climate refugees.” Therefore, they call for negotiation of “the international legal ramifications of the various scenarios” at the upcoming Copenhagen talks in December.

One of the pictures from Somalia by ROBERTO SCHMIDT

Second, a piece by Bec Hamilton in The New Republic on “why aid for Darfur’s rape survivors has all but disappeared.”

Third, Jim Zogby reports on Arabs and Jews coming together in Washington for peace.

And finally, breaking news from Sudan’s Second Vice President Ali Mohamed Osman Taha,  ”The devil (has been contained) in Darfur”!  He made this declaration after a reconciliation meeting yesterday between two Darfuri tribes, the Misseriya and the Rizeigat.  One tribe agreed to pay the other tribe the traditional blood money – and both agreed to peaceful relations going forward.  For Taha, this was evidence that the devil’s doings may finally be stifled in Darfur.  Its convenient of course to blame the six years of chaos on the devil – and not, of course, Taha’s friends in the Sudanese government.