On Wednesday, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the challenges facing the forty million people of Sudan. General Gration gave a sobering and honest assessment of the post-election situation in Darfur, where violence has been on the rise, and of the potential roadblocks to a peaceful and transparent referenda process early next year.

The Senators pressed General Gration on the administration’s plans and available resources to respond effectively to “all possible scenarios.” As Senator John Kerry noted, the international community is in a rare position to have “a map of the fault-lines” of a crisis. While General Gration seemed to be surprisingly comfortable with the current resources at his own disposal within the State Department, he acknowledged the magnitude of the challenge. For example, General Gration agreed with the recent assessment by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that South Sudan is currently the area of the world most at-risk for mass killing or genocide. He also highlighted the key issues that could be triggers for conflict during the referendum period – most notably the demarcation of borders and oil sharing.

On Darfur, General Gration stressed for the first time in unequivocal language that general insecurity and lawlessness remains his chief concern.  Rather than once again touting gains from the protracted peace talks in Doha or the diplomatic rapprochement between Sudan and Chad, he stated bluntly that such progress on the strategic level “has not changed the lives of people on the ground…[who] don’t have a way out.” Specifically, he noted as unacceptable the continuing offensive in Jebel Marra, the continued aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the breakdown in the ceasefire between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese government.  His frank acknowledgement of the unfilled gaps in services for victims of gender-based violence since the expulsion of 13 humanitarian aid organizations in March 2009 was also particularly noteworthy.

To make progress on comprehensive security in Darfur, General Gration described his efforts to push the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force to “get out of the [major] towns” and to patrol the roads and the rural areas. This appeal carried the caveat that it is the Government of Sudan that has the ultimate responsibility to provide protection to its citizens and that they continue to fail miserably. In highlighting the unchanged mentality of the regime, he noted that the walis (governors) and local government leaders in Darfur have done very little to put in legal systems to identify those who commit crimes and then to bring them to justice.

With such disturbing realities in Darfur and potential for violence in the South, the Senators wanted to know how the United States could increase its leverage in Sudan. Some, like Senator Roger Wicker, accurately questioned whether Secretary Hillary Clinton or Ambassador Susan Rice should be making this more of a personal priority. He even noted a series of ads by Save Darfur and some of our partners making this case. In response, General Gration felt that the current level of involvement of Clinton and Rice was sufficient. With that said, he also announced that he would be sending a senior level diplomat to Juba next month to lead a diplomatic surge before the referendum.

It was also refreshing to hear General Gration agree with Save Darfur’s position that the international community as a whole is not coordinated, nor doing enough – and that this must change. This point relates to another critical statement by Gration: that continuing to marginalize the regime in Khartoum can be an effective pressure point. This was his response to a question from Senator Russell Feingold on what tools the United States would have available if Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party attempted to disrupt the 2011 referendum. General Gration would not reveal specific decisions that could be made by Obama’s National Security Council, but he said the United States would not tolerate any “messing” with the referendum. And then he importantly added that our forms of pressure can be more effective if we can get other nations to go along with them.

This revealing conversation then begs the question of what is the administration doing to make its incentives and pressures on the Sudanese government multilateral. The United States clearly did not attempt to sync closely its response to the fraudulent elections with other countries. So while a State Department spokesperson said the elections would not bestow legitimacy on the Bashir regime, there was not a coordinated message coming from our partners in Europe or important countries in Africa and the Arab world – some of which actually made statements suggesting the elections did meet certain standards of acceptability.

Going forward, if multilateral pressure is the most effective foreign policy tool, what are General Gration and the administration doing to establish a unified international plan on the following sticks and carrots? Here are a few areas that should be explored:

• Non-toleration for a Disrupted Referendum: while General Gration says a disruption will not be tolerated by the United States, it certainly could be by others in the same way the elections were accepted. What standards for success and consequences for failure are being jointly planned with European, African and Arab partners?
• Oil and wealth sharing: a critical issue for the Chinese and Japanese, the largest importers of Sudanese oil. Are the United States, China, and Japan coordinated in pressuring the North and South to reach a deal before the referendum?
• Border demarcation: both the African Union Panel on Darfur and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development are involved in the mediation of this issue. What consequences would other African countries have for either the North or the South if their actions were identified as obstructionist in finalizing the demarcation?
• Debt-relief: a carrot that the Sudanese government wants desperately. What conditions has the United States set and is it working with global partners on this issue?
• International Criminal Court: the non-cooperation of the Sudanese government and the indictment of Bashir will continue to make it a pariah state for many countries. Are the United States and its partners still clearly sending this message?

Sudanese women registering to vote

First posted at Save Darfur…

A new report by the Carter Center on Sudan’s elections expresses grave concerns about recent security crackdowns. The report should serve as an urgent wake-up call for the international community that the necessary conditions for free and fair elections currently do not exist in Sudan. Instead, the lack of political freedoms and the gross registration violations, especially in Darfur, shed clear light on the ruling National Congress Party’s intentions for these elections: a fraudulent process designed to legitimize its undemocratic, repressive and genocidal rule.

Jerry Fowler, Save Darfur’s president, stated in a press release today:

The Carter Center’s report came as no surprise. Sudanese civil society and opposition leaders for the last two weeks have been speaking out loudly about the gross human rights and elections violations of a repressive regime. By and large, the international community has remained quiet while these activists and opposition leaders have been threatened, harassed, and beaten throughout Sudan. The situation, as the Carter Center report acknowledges, is even more severe in Darfur. The heavy military and intelligence presence at the registration sites and the lack of even the basic freedoms make it impossible for the people of Darfur to participate in a credible elections process.

Given the alarming nature of the Carter Center’s report, Save Darfur has urged the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration, to work with his international counterparts and demand answers from the Sudanese government on the following issues:

Lack of Basic Freedoms. Several recent incidents – such as the crackdown on protesters in Khartoum and the beating and detentions of journalists – have clearly demonstrated the lack of political rights and freedoms in Sudan necessary for free and fair elections.

The Carter Center reported:

• [T]he Center…expressed serious concerns about incidents that undermine political rights and fundamental freedoms in Sudan, including: arrests, detention and harassment of civil society and political party members for constitutional and peaceful activity in Khartoum and other cities by security services, and attacks on the National Congress Party (NCP) premises in Wau and Rumbek.
• The Center is gravely concerned by the recent action of the security forces in Khartoum to restrict legitimate activity related to the exercise of freedom of assembly, association and speech. The Center urges the Government of Sudan to cease arbitrary arrests and to release persons detained while conducting peaceful political activities.
• According to a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior on September 17, 2009, notification by a political party of intention to hold a rally is sufficient for such an event to go ahead. The Ministry should urgently clarify procedures for the holding of political rallies and events. In addition, the Ministry and other officials should take immediate steps to ensure the necessary authorizations for such public events. The Government of Sudan should take all necessary steps to investigate claims of police brutality and take swift action against officials who are found to have perpetrated or permitted unwarranted acts of violence against civilians. If the police are to be perceived as a credible and neutral force in managing elections security, constitutional standards and freedoms must be respected.
• In Southern Sudan, the Government of Southern Sudan should take action to ensure that political party pluralism is fully protected. This must extend to the activities of all parties, including the NCP in Southern Sudan. The arson of the NCP’s office annex in Wau and the looting and attempted arson of the NCP’s premises in Rumbek are criminal acts. The Government of Southern Sudan should pursue the perpetrators without delay to the full extent of the law. Obligations in public international law lay out the need for investigation by the government and redress in any cases of violations of human rights.

Limitations/Obstruction/Intimidation in Darfur. The Carter Center observers were not able to fully assess the registration process due to several security limitations. It is reported that many Darfuris chose not the register due to the presence of Sudanese government armed forces at numerous registration sites, in addition to the wariness about a free and transparent election process.

The Carter Center reported:

• Due to security limitations in Darfur, Carter Center observers were not able to travel as widely as would be necessary to fully assess the quality and inclusiveness of the registration process throughout the region…State elections committees in Darfur were not able to access all areas of the region, particularly those not under government control, and the armed movements did not encourage registration activity. State elections committees did not and were not able to visit all IDP camps, which partially accounts for the relatively low rate of registration in the three states. Registration is a voluntary exercise and some IDPs in Darfur chose not to participate.
• In areas visited by the Carter Center mission, observers reported that Sudanese Armed Forces military units, Sudanese police, and agents of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) were present at registration centers. Electoral authorities confirmed the presence of NISS agents at many registration centers. In some instances, NISS agents were actively engaged in the registration process, e.g. by laminating voter registration receipts, a practice which undermined the independence of the electoral management authorities, and which raises questions about the role of NISS in the electoral process. In North Darfur, Center observers reported the presence of vehicles with heavy mounted weapons (technicals) outside of registration sites, in a show of force that may have intimidated registrants.
• Given the possibility of heightened tensions in the run-up to the elections, the NEC and state elections committees in Darfur should take immediate action to ensure that the presence of security forces is sufficient to ensure public order, but limited to their appropriate role. The security services should not execute tasks that are the specific responsibility of the elections committees.
• Most importantly, political actors must take immediate steps to build the foundations of a genuine political settlement in Darfur in advance of next year’s elections. The state of emergency and extreme limitations on freedom of assembly and association stifle a free and open campaign process. The NEC and GONU must take urgent steps to implement broad civic education programs, lift restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and association, and ensure that civil society organizations can fully participate in the electoral process. These steps are critical to ensuring that the citizens of Darfur can meaningfully participate in Sudan’s electoral process, as required by Sudan’s national and international obligations.

Accreditation for Election Observers. The lack of clarity in procedures has placed an undue burden on domestic observer groups in applying for accreditation, as well as on registration officials in allowing observers access to the process. It is critical that no Southern or Northern Sudanese government officials interfere with the election monitoring process.

The Carter Center reported:

• The lack of clarity in procedures placed an undue burden on domestic observer groups in applying for accreditation, as well as on registration officials in allowing observers access to the process. The NEC should take steps to facilitate simple and fast accreditation procedures for domestic observers for the remainder of the electoral process, as the right for domestic observers to participate in Sudan’s electoral process is a key component of both national laws and international obligations.

Suspicion of Voter Intimidation: Alarming reports from the Carter Center may point to a larger plan to rig the elections or intimidate voters on election day.

The Carter Center reported:

• Some parties, principally the NCP, collected voter registration receipts, and/or recorded the registration numbers and corresponding identifying details of registrants. While not in violation of the electoral law, party agents did not appear to explain that this practice was not an official step of the registration process, resulting in confusion for many registrants. Carter Center observers also observed representatives of the SPLM and NCP laminating registration slips and directly participating in registration activities. Such organized political party activity in close proximity to registration centers was problematic. In the future, political parties should ensure that their members do not engage in activity that could undermine public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. For the polling period, the NEC should consider specifying a minimum distance from which political parties are allowed to operate, and should clearly delineate activities that are not permissible within the vicinity of polling centers (though allowing the activity of accredited political party agents).

This unusual moment of cohesion demonstrates why effective implementation of the American plan will be paramount in achieving the objectives set out in the policy review. When all sides praise your plan, despite having contradictory interests and motives, you must realize that your work has only just begun.  What will shape these actors long-term interpretation of the Obama administration’s policy are not the principles or strategies found in the review, but the very next steps in the engagement process.

For instance, Sudanese presidential adviser Ghazi Salah Al-Deen told the Sudanese news agency that the lack of any reference to military intervention “is important” and that the plan constitutes a “new spirit” for the Obama administration.  At the same time though, he criticized the administration’s description of Darfur as a “genocide” and said that the Sudanese government would not respond to a “policy of pressure” which it considers disrespectful and reflects “old mindsets” that found their way into the policy review (article in Arabic).  The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) deputy secretary-general Anne Itto remarked simply: “The policy is in line with the SPLM position.”

As for the Darfuri rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur hailed the affirmation of the “genocide” label for the Darfur conflict and said that the administration’s calls for “conflict suspension and providing security to civilians” were completely in line with the SLM position.  However, he then criticized the efforts of Gration thus far stating that the special envoy had turned these principles “upside down” by making “genocide legitimate” (presumably by engaging with Sudanese officials) and “creating new [rebel] groups.”  A spokesperson for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) also said the policy “show[s] a good direction to resolve the conflict,” but then urged Washington to realize that Khartoum only want to buy time and lacks “the will to achieve peace.”  The spokesperson concluded: “The US must press Khartoum to respond positively to genuine international will looking to bring peace.”

Of course, Gration and the administration will make critical decisions soon that upend this consensus about the tone and substance of American policy toward Sudan.  All parties have expressed a desire for U.S. leadership, but they have different expectations and fears regarding what American engagement actually means.  From the first day of implementation (today!), Gration and others in the administration must remain clear about their intentions and objectives – as well as their expectations for Sudan’s leaders.

Such an approach will mean that the United States immediately:

• Holds the Sudanese government accountable for ongoing human rights abuses in Darfur – such as its refusal to acknowledge the widespread incidences of rape, its obstruction of the provision of humanitarian assistance and the full unhindered deployment of UNAMID, and the use of disproportionate force by the Sudanese Armed Forces
• Pressures the National Congress Party to create an atmosphere suitable to holding free and fair elections, and then make public the measures by which the administration will judge the credibility of elections
• Pushes the National Congress Party to pass critical pieces of legislation pertaining to the national security laws, freedom of press, freedom of association, and the 2011 referendum
• Condemns the Sudanese government’s ongoing harassment of Sudanese human rights defenders
• Urges the Government of South Sudan to tackle potentially explosive corruption issues and to coordinate with UNMIS to enhance police and SPLA capacity to ensure civilian protection
• Encourages the Darfuri rebel movements to adopt a unified negotiating stance for upcoming talks that includes a role for civil society representatives, including women

Emergencies and crises will arise in the next few months that will fully test the administration’s commitment to its stated policies of resolving Darfur and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  By taking the above steps now, the U.S. can assure all sides of the seriousness and substance of its policy – and, equally important, it can clearly demonstrate what is expected of Sudan’s leaders as the country and its people wrestle with the significant challenges before it.

First posted at Save Darfur….please also see my colleague Robert’s post with our initial reaction to the Sudan Policy Review.

This morning Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and General Gration all spoke of the “sense of urgency” in dealing with Sudan’s interlocking crises.  Two breaking headlines from Sudan today confirm the urgent necessity of finding a durable solution to Darfur and preventing the collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

First, Bloomberg News is reporting that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement announced today that it will boycott parliament for a week to pressure the country’s ruling party to amend bills including one that gives “unlimited powers” to intelligence services.  This move comes after a weekend where the National Congress Party and SPLM reached a tentative compromise on the referendum.Yet, this progress was not enough to meet the SPLM’s ultimatum last week that gave parliament a week to make significant progress on a number of pieces of critical legislation:

“We want to see a parliamentary schedule for the discussion of all the nine laws,” Yasser Arman, head of the former rebel group’s northern sector, told reporters today in Khartoum. “The current security law allows for detention, search and arrest, and gives a lot of immunity to the security body. And this is against the constitution.”

Arman goes on to say that the NCP now has until October 26; otherwise the SPLM will boycott the remaining sessions in parliament that run until November 30.

The other troubling news comes from UNAMID, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, which released the following warning about a noticeable increase in military activities in Darfur:

UNAMID personnel in the field have recently observed a sizable and unusual increase in military activities by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid Faction (SLA/AW) forces, notably in the areas of Sortony and Kabkabiya in North Darfur. UNAMID is gravely concerned by this build-up as it may signal the impending start of a new cycle of armed confrontations in the area.

UNAMID wishes to emphasize that armed clashes invariably result in casualties and fatalities among combatants and in dire consequences for the civilian population, with loss of life, destruction of property, and massive displacement, thus negating the gains made so far in attempts to restore peace to Darfur.

UNAMID solemnly calls on all parties involved to refrain from resorting to violence and reiterates its conviction that the only way for a peaceful resolution of the conflict is through dialogue and negotiations.

These troubling reports demonstrate why – as Secretary Clinton remarked – the conflicts and issues in Sudan “cannot be ignored or willed away” and why the U.S. government must immediately begin implementing a policy that “empowers the people of Sudan to solve their own problems.”  The status quo no doubt portends the worse for Sudanese.  The complex diplomatic tasks at hand require – as we have called – the full leveraging of every relevant piece of the U.S. government and the generation from the administration of multilateral, coordinated support.

Mr. Badawi in his recent post “Indebted to the Save Darfur Coalition?” plays loose with the numbers and the definition of Sudan’s “odious” debt. In addition, he mischaracterizes the objectives of the Save Darfur Coalition’s position related to how the international community should deal with Sudan’s debt crisis and ignores the coalition’s support thus far of the Obama Administration’s engagement strategy with Khartoum.  We have repeatedly called for the U.S. to offer Sudan’s leaders with a choice between earned incentives for durable peace and escalating costs to those who obstruct efforts to resolve Sudan’s interlocking crises.  It is necessary, as Mr. Badawi argues, for the international community to rid the Sudanese people of this burdensome and “odious” debt accumulated by multiple regimes in Khartoum – but the burden of proof first lies with Sudan’s leaders to demonstrate that they have finally committed to extinguishing the flames of decades of conflict in Sudan.

To begin with the facts, Mr. Badawi is just plain wrong when he states that the “explosion [in debt] has been almost solely [due] to a build-up of repayment arrears to bilateral and multilateral creditors.” From 1989 until today, the Sudanese government has received an estimated $4 billion in new public medium and long-term loans and an estimated $5 billion in new private medium and long-term loans (information via Economist Intelligence Unit, a past employer of Mr. Badawi).  Much of this new debt is even more recent.  Sudan accumulated over $2 billion in new loans from international lenders (almost half of it from non-Paris Club bilateral loans) between 2001 and 2006 when it was still waging war in south Sudan and orchestrating its campaign of death and destruction in Darfur. In 2007 and 2008 alone, Sudan contracted another $1.444 billion in more loans mostly from Arab multilateral and non-Paris club creditors, as well as from China and India.

This data reveals that many in the international community continued to give to the Sudanese regime while it was waging war and genocide against its own people.  Sudan’s arrears certainly did balloon during this period by $12 billion to bring its total arrears to $18 billion (half of its estimated debt load of $36 billion), but NIF/NCP leaders also contracted new irresponsible loans to finance their destructive policies.  From their own reporting,Sudan imported weapons worth $76.3 million between 2004 and 2006, not including fighter jets and combat aircraft.  The cost of Sudan’s purchase of 20 MiG-29s and 26 attack helicopters from 2004 to 2008 is unknown but most experts conservatively estimate the price-tag at hundreds of millions of dollars.  Recent reports, furthermore, allege that this advanced military buildup continues.

These figures lead me to Mr. Badawi’s second slight of hand.  While designating the Nimeiri regime’s debt as “odious,” he shows absolutely no willingness to apply the same standards to President Bashir’s twenty-year old regime. Any amount of intellectual honesty should have led him to consider this $9 billion in new loans as “odious” as well.  This financing certainly did not go to improve the lot of the war-battered Southern Sudanese and Darfuris over the last two decades.  In making the case for immediate debt-relief for Sudan, Mr. Badawi argues that “the pattern of inequitable development in Darfur, south Sudan, and other areas of the ‘periphery’… lies at the heart of Sudan’s history of instability.”  With that said, his argumentation implies that such marginalization was a product purely of the Nimeiri regime – certainly an absurd historical account given that the civil war with the SPLA escalated in the years after the 1989 coup and such marginalization was a chief motivation of the Beja rebellion that began in the late 1990s and the Darfuri rebellion in 2003.

It is also questionable whether the vast majority of northern Sudanese have seen their conditions improve.  Their political rights, as consistently protested by northern opposition parties and democracy and human rights activists, continue to be severely curtailed.  Last week, in fact, the Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance ranked Sudan 49^th out of 54 countries, noting that Sudan “scored well below the continental average in the categories of Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights and Sustainable Economic Opportunity.” And even on strictly economic grounds, Sudan has not yet met the pre-conditions for theHeavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  Most notably, the Sudanese government has yet to complete its National Poverty Reduction Strategy paper in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Given its track record, the current Sudanese government should not be surprised that advocates for peace and human rights in Sudan fail to take their argument about being unfairly burdened with Nimeiri’s debt and the related arrears seriously. President Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi took direct ownership of this debt when they carried out their unconstitutional coup in 1989 and usurped all vestiges of state power. Flouting the international community, they ignored the arrears that piled up as they instituted their reign of terror in the 1990s.  Bashir and the NCP then, as shown above, have used billions in new loans this decade to finance not only crucial infrastructure for the new oil economy – but continuing repression, civil war, and even genocide.

Severely affected by the global financial crisis, the Sudanese government currently seeks assistance from the international community to avoid a financial meltdown.  Recent hubris underpinned by the Khartoum-boom now makes way for urgent appeals for debt-relief. Save Darfur’s campaign intends to remind the international community of the odious character of this debt contracted by a regime that remains in power and continues to obstruct peacemaking efforts in Darfur and the democratic transformation set forth in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  International financiers should not subsidize the continuation of such policies, orchestrated by a government with an indicted war criminal at its head, that are leading the country toward even further chaos and ruin.

Save Darfur has also begun educating American policymakers and Sudan’s other major creditors on the real opportunity that debt-relief provides to incentivize peacemaking in Sudan in a multilateral, coordinated manner.  Of course, it’s useful for those defending the Sudanese government, in the name of “ordinary” Sudanese people, to treat Save Darfur’s advocacy (for this specific initiative and in general) as a simplistic campaign to punish those in power in Khartoum.  It’s also useful for these writers to conflate activist campaigns like “Fast the Eid” – to which Save Darfur had no relation – with the serious policy proposals put forward by the organization.

Mr. Badawi’s description of Save Darfur fundamentally mischaracterizes the coalition’s approach to the Obama Administration’s engagement strategy. Up until now, we have supported the active efforts of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General Scott Gration to revive the constantly-adrift Darfur peace process and to help facilitate the ongoing negotiations surrounding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  In fact, we have urged Gration to do even more to help create space, opportunities, and incentives for Sudanese to solve their own problems, such as sponsoring civil society mechanisms for non-combatants to participate in the Darfur negotiations.

With Sudan at a dangerous crossroads, we have consistently called for President Obama to present those in power in Khartoum with a choice between earned incentives or serious consequences.  To that end, the U.S. should put forward a clear but conditioned process toward normalization of relations with Sudan if, and only if, the government of Sudan provably: permits unrestricted humanitarian access; secures peace in Darfur; fully implements the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; ensures free and fair elections throughout Sudan; and removes the president who is a fugitive from justice.  On the other hand, the U.S. should make clear to President Bashir and his party that if they renege on humanitarian commitments and continue to undermine efforts at peace, escalating costs will ensue.

With this strategic approach to providing incentives and disincentives to those in power in Khartoum, the Obama Administration should utilize the ready-made multilateral stick/carrot of debt-relief.  Mr. Badawi chose to ignore the political conditions that Save Darfur has set out for the provision of debt-relief to Sudan.  In our public statements, we have said that if the government demonstrably changes its behavior to the benefit of all of Sudan’s people,the U.S. should lead the way in facilitating a debt-relief package for Sudan with the international community.  On the other hand, if the Sudanese government fails to match its rhetoric for peace with proven action, then the U.S. should make it clear to Sudan that it will use its role at the IMF, as well as its position in the Paris Club, to block any potential debt-relief package.  The American message should be simple: the international community will not help Sudan with its economic crisis unless the Sudanese regime takes concrete and lasting steps to resolve Darfur, implement the CPA, and enact true reform to the benefit of its citizens.

These are the internal political solutions – outlined most recently by a cross-section of Sudanese political parties in the Juba Declaration – which the Obama Administration must support in its engagement with the Sudanese government.  Indeed, these should be the parameters for – as Alex de Waal writes – “a more constructive political and economic engagement with Sudan, precisely because that will help shift the political centre of gravity in Sudan away from the sterile military/militaristic polarization to a civil-political process that nurtures democracy.” Without first achieving these political solutions and implementing these reforms, debt-relief now for Sudan would give unearned incentives to a regime that has shown no clear and demonstrable signs of finally kicking its murderous and odious ways.