On Wednesday, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the challenges facing the forty million people of Sudan. General Gration gave a sobering and honest assessment of the post-election situation in Darfur, where violence has been on the rise, and of the potential roadblocks to a peaceful and transparent referenda process early next year.

The Senators pressed General Gration on the administration’s plans and available resources to respond effectively to “all possible scenarios.” As Senator John Kerry noted, the international community is in a rare position to have “a map of the fault-lines” of a crisis. While General Gration seemed to be surprisingly comfortable with the current resources at his own disposal within the State Department, he acknowledged the magnitude of the challenge. For example, General Gration agreed with the recent assessment by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that South Sudan is currently the area of the world most at-risk for mass killing or genocide. He also highlighted the key issues that could be triggers for conflict during the referendum period – most notably the demarcation of borders and oil sharing.

On Darfur, General Gration stressed for the first time in unequivocal language that general insecurity and lawlessness remains his chief concern.  Rather than once again touting gains from the protracted peace talks in Doha or the diplomatic rapprochement between Sudan and Chad, he stated bluntly that such progress on the strategic level “has not changed the lives of people on the ground…[who] don’t have a way out.” Specifically, he noted as unacceptable the continuing offensive in Jebel Marra, the continued aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the breakdown in the ceasefire between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese government.  His frank acknowledgement of the unfilled gaps in services for victims of gender-based violence since the expulsion of 13 humanitarian aid organizations in March 2009 was also particularly noteworthy.

To make progress on comprehensive security in Darfur, General Gration described his efforts to push the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force to “get out of the [major] towns” and to patrol the roads and the rural areas. This appeal carried the caveat that it is the Government of Sudan that has the ultimate responsibility to provide protection to its citizens and that they continue to fail miserably. In highlighting the unchanged mentality of the regime, he noted that the walis (governors) and local government leaders in Darfur have done very little to put in legal systems to identify those who commit crimes and then to bring them to justice.

With such disturbing realities in Darfur and potential for violence in the South, the Senators wanted to know how the United States could increase its leverage in Sudan. Some, like Senator Roger Wicker, accurately questioned whether Secretary Hillary Clinton or Ambassador Susan Rice should be making this more of a personal priority. He even noted a series of ads by Save Darfur and some of our partners making this case. In response, General Gration felt that the current level of involvement of Clinton and Rice was sufficient. With that said, he also announced that he would be sending a senior level diplomat to Juba next month to lead a diplomatic surge before the referendum.

It was also refreshing to hear General Gration agree with Save Darfur’s position that the international community as a whole is not coordinated, nor doing enough – and that this must change. This point relates to another critical statement by Gration: that continuing to marginalize the regime in Khartoum can be an effective pressure point. This was his response to a question from Senator Russell Feingold on what tools the United States would have available if Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party attempted to disrupt the 2011 referendum. General Gration would not reveal specific decisions that could be made by Obama’s National Security Council, but he said the United States would not tolerate any “messing” with the referendum. And then he importantly added that our forms of pressure can be more effective if we can get other nations to go along with them.

This revealing conversation then begs the question of what is the administration doing to make its incentives and pressures on the Sudanese government multilateral. The United States clearly did not attempt to sync closely its response to the fraudulent elections with other countries. So while a State Department spokesperson said the elections would not bestow legitimacy on the Bashir regime, there was not a coordinated message coming from our partners in Europe or important countries in Africa and the Arab world – some of which actually made statements suggesting the elections did meet certain standards of acceptability.

Going forward, if multilateral pressure is the most effective foreign policy tool, what are General Gration and the administration doing to establish a unified international plan on the following sticks and carrots? Here are a few areas that should be explored:

• Non-toleration for a Disrupted Referendum: while General Gration says a disruption will not be tolerated by the United States, it certainly could be by others in the same way the elections were accepted. What standards for success and consequences for failure are being jointly planned with European, African and Arab partners?
• Oil and wealth sharing: a critical issue for the Chinese and Japanese, the largest importers of Sudanese oil. Are the United States, China, and Japan coordinated in pressuring the North and South to reach a deal before the referendum?
• Border demarcation: both the African Union Panel on Darfur and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development are involved in the mediation of this issue. What consequences would other African countries have for either the North or the South if their actions were identified as obstructionist in finalizing the demarcation?
• Debt-relief: a carrot that the Sudanese government wants desperately. What conditions has the United States set and is it working with global partners on this issue?
• International Criminal Court: the non-cooperation of the Sudanese government and the indictment of Bashir will continue to make it a pariah state for many countries. Are the United States and its partners still clearly sending this message?

My colleagues Jerry Fowler and Mark Lotwis left Sudan last Friday heading back to Washington.  In order to set up a few more meetings in the South, I stayed on in Juba. Little did we know President Omar al-Bashir and his entourage of advisors and security agents would be coming to town—and staying in the same modest hotel as the Save Darfur delegation, in the very wing where Jerry had been sleeping.

Over the weekend, I had heard that Bashir would be traveling to Juba and a few other towns in the South to campaign.  In my mind, I imagined a quick dash by motorcade from the airport to a rally in Juba and then a few darts by plane to some other choice locations in the Greater Equatoria states.

So I was quite surprised when early Monday afternoon, I was confronted by a newly erected roadblock in front of my hotel.  Initially, the mix of police and security officials told me that I could not pass. When I explained that I was staying at the hotel beyond their checkpoint, they quickly scanned my backpack and then gave me strict instructions on how to walk to the next crowd of security personnel suddenly stationed in front of hotel gate.  After another round of negotiations that involved coaxing hotel staff out to verify my claims, I was finally permitted to enter the foyer—where I was promptly urged by a security guard to take my room key and, like a misbehaving child, go straight to my room.

About an hour later, I returned to reception to ask about the “protocol” and restrictions in place due to the arrival of the special guest from Khartoum.  The staff assured me that the security had overreacted in the first few hours and gave me a stamped pass that would allow me to go and come as I please. Thus far, I have not faced any further issues – other than that inescapable locked-down feeling of any setting where men with guns sit and stand around every entrance and exit, looking all-too-bored for any by-stander’s comfort.

Ironically enough, I did not have to leave the hotel to watch Bashir’s political rally. My window afforded a partial view of the stadium.  I could not make out the words of his speech, but at times I could hear the crowd break out with a chant of “Salaam, Oyay” (Peace, Yes!).

Maggie Ficke of the ENOUGH Project was inside the stadium and reported on the climate.

Papers the next day quoted Bashir as making an economic case for unity. He argued that Sudan’s economy could expand by a higher percent if all efforts are exerted to end political tensions:

“that have encouraged nothing than regional wars and displacement of inhabitants…To experience real growth and success in the war against poverty, we must get our act together on two fronts…[O]ur politics must promote political stability and public confidence in the future of our country.”

Bashir, dressed down in a short sleeve shirt, treated the crowd to some interesting campaign rhetoric, such as “We will cut off every hand attempting to disrupt peace.” He also promised to celebrate with the people of the South after the referendum, whether they chose unity or secession.

In my conversations though in Juba thus far, it’s clear that Bashir’s last stab to make unity attractive will fall mostly on deaf ears. People are gearing up for the elections to contest leadership within the Government of South Sudan, but with a keen eye on the referendum. As for those in Darfur, very few trust these most recent promises from Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) – and, thus, confidence in a durable political resolution emerging from the Doha negotiations remains low.

With my flight out of Juba soon to depart, I hope to have more time to write about the many interesting conversations that we have had in Sudan over the last four weeks.  For now, I can say that having visited Khartoum, the three capitals of Darfur and Juba, one cannot help but be struck by the depth of complexity to the immediate crises and issues at hand.  Peace, prosperity and development for all Sudanese – the slogans of Bashir’s campaign – can be realized over time, but first a profound and dramatic shift in the mentality of those in power and those who dominate politics through fear and violence must occur.

“Bashir’s Pre-Election Victory Lap at the Scene of the Crime”

Can you imagine Slobodan Milosevic running for president in Srebrenica? The world would have been justifiably outraged. Yesterday, however, indicted war criminal Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir visited El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. While not an official campaign appearance, the trip comes three days after Bashir received the formal presidential nomination of his party in the upcoming elections in April. It is long past due for the world – and particularly the United States – to express its grave concern about the sham electoral process that in a few months could effectively legitimize Bashir’s repressive government. Read the rest here.

Here is the meat of it…

My issue with this essay though, and other less well-researched criticisms of the advocacy movement (see Mahmood Mamdani’s diatribes), is that it captures the fluidity and complexity of international politics and American activism to the gross neglect of important shifts and dynamics in Sudanese politics. The essay goes half-way by discussing the highly politicized nature of the IDP camps in Darfur today. By reading the complete essay though, one would think that Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) have successfully rebuffed all international pressures and that they have once again securely protected their monopolization of power and wealth in the country.

But as those who follow Sudanese politics closely know, Khartoum is not the same Khartoum today. The regime has its back against the wall and is fighting for survival in a self-destructive way unseen in its twenty years of dominance. Such an analysis is at the heart of the International Crisis Group recent paper entitled, “Sudan: Preventing an Implosion.”

Consistent international condemnation and isolation of the Bashir regime’s egregious actions in Darfur, South Sudan, and even in Khartoum and other areas of North Sudan, have opened the door for Sudanese actors committed to human rights and a more democratic and liberal form of governance to speak out and challenge the regime. The recent demonstrations of the Juba forces and the emergence of grassroots groups like Girifna are the two most obvious examples.  Reported cracks within the NCP regarding the future of the party and the state also reveal that all may not be well within the ruling cabal. The elections scheduled for April 2010 could put to the test all of these changing dynamics, especially if the opposition and civil society continue to work together to demand greater freedoms and civil rights. The international community and activists should not take sides in these elections, but they should continue to demand greater political space to allow Sudanese politics to take place without resorting to violence and repression.

Protesters yesterday in Khartoum, courtesy of Girifna

First posted at Save Darfur…

It was déjà vu yesterday in Khartoum, when on the second Monday in a row the police and security agencies loyal to Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) forcibly shut down a peaceful demonstration organized by the Juba group (those political parties that signed the Juba Declaration in September) . The student group Girifna has a gallery of photos from the scuttled demonstration. This time NCP officials tried vigorously to split the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) from the network of political parties calling for reforms to the national security laws, peace in Darfur, and free and fair elections in April 2010.

On Sunday, the SPLM and NCP announced a breakthrough in their negotiations over the 2011 referendum, the status of the Abyei area, and the popular consultations promised to the people of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan. So on Monday NCP officials said that the SPLM had also agreed to suspend the protests warning that any move to the contrary would nullify the recent breakthrough. SPLM leaders though denied these reports, with Yasir Arman, the deputy secretary general of the SPLM, stating: “any attempts to drive a wedge between the SPLM and the Juba forces will not succeed.”

Instead, some SPLM officials participated in the demonstration and afterwards they and other participants strongly condemned the use of tear gas to disperse the gathered crowds. In addition, Pagan Amum, the secretary general of the SPLM, accused (in Arabic) the NCP of paying people to suppress the demonstration.

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) today put out the most detailed report of yesterday’s events:

On Monday 14 December 2009, Sudanese security forces dispersed a peaceful protest organised by the Juba Declaration Forces, and aimed at presenting a petition to parliament detailing needed legislative changes and demanding the establishment of an enabling environment for free and fair national elections. The crowd was dispersed using tear gas and rubber bullets which led to at least seven people being seriously injured. People were pursued into private homes, pulled out and forced to sit down and be beaten.

One victim, Rania Musa Tahir, sustained a serious head injury and a broken arm. Shames Aldeen Abdelraheem, a man in his 70s, also sustained a serious head injury and injuries to his shoulder. A rubber bullet also hit Mutaz Mohammed and seriously injured him. All three were taken to the hospital.

Nine journalists were arrested, including seven from Soaut el Umma newspaper, and Lucia John from Al-Sharouk TV and Rashan Oshi, a journalist from Al Tayar newspaper. These detainees were reportedly beaten in police custody. Several other journalists and correspondents of international media were beaten in the streets and a number had their cameras and other equipment confiscated.

A number of other people were arrested, as well, including:

• Hala Abdelhaleem, the leader of the HAQ or New Forces Movement
• Mubarak El Fadil Mahdi, the head of the reformist branch of the Umma party
• Mariam al Sadiq al Mahdi, of the Umma party
• Abdullah Deng Nyal, of the Popular National Congress
• Mohammed Jalal Aldeen Hashim, an activist and university professor
• Faisal Shabu, communist party
• Makki Ali Bilail, head of the Justice Party and a former minister of government

A total of 118 people were detained, and a fuller list of detainees is available upon request. 48 faced trial today.

In addition, parallel demonstrations in other cities were also disrupted. In Atbara , in the North of Sudan, 13 people were arrested. Among those arrested there was Sid Ahmed Alkhatib, a medical doctor and a well known trade unionist. In Sinja, in Southern Blue Nile, five people were arrested.

Available information indicates that the protesters were seeking only to peacefully voice their political opinions. Their right to do so is protected by Article 39 of the Sudanese Interim Constitution and should be respected. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies calls on the government of Sudan to immediately charge the detainees with an internationally-recognised criminal offense or release them. In addition, we emphasize that the suppression of such protests undermines not only national and international guarantees with regard to freedom of expression, but also impedes the process of carrying out free and fair elections in Sudan scheduled for April 2010, and the full implementation of the democratisation programme envisioned by the CPA.

On this day of repression in Sudan, the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration was present in Khartoum. After meetings yesterday with Sudanese officials, he welcomed the breakthrough agreement between the NCP and SPLM. However, he also “condemned any kind of violence and encouraged the leaders of the political forces to work to adopt implementation mechanisms and dialogue to move forward on the outstanding issues and create a climate for negotiations that will bring about the desired change” (in Arabic).

Protests in Sudan Today

First posted at Save Darfur…

Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) failed another test today of their commitment to holding free and fair elections in Sudan scheduled for April 2010.  Responding to a march (see video here of crowds chanting “Freedom, Peace and Security”) planned by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and northern opposition parties, the Sudanese security forces violently quashed the demonstration and arrested a number of Sudanese politicians and activists.  We have been compiling information throughout the day.

The following is a run down and here is also a collection of pictures.

Amnesty International confirms that over 200 people, including opposition leaders and human rights activists, were arrested at the demonstration. It demanded that Sudanese authorities announce the names and whereabouts of those arrested and either charge them with recognized criminal offenses or release them immediately:

“This is yet another example of the culture of violence that the Sudanese government has adopted,” said Tawanda Hondora, deputy director of the Africa program at Amnesty International. “The government must respect the right of protesters to peacefully assemble and express their views. This is a crucial time for Sudan and all parties should abstain from using violence, especially in the light of the coming elections and referendum.”

Two of the leading members of the SPLM, Pagan Amum and Yasir Arman, were among those arrested. Our sources tell us that Arman was beaten severely by a group of police officers before being taken to the hospital.  Both men are now free. The children and grandchildren of Sudanese opposition leaders Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma Party) and Hassan al-Turabi (Popular Congress Party) were also detained during the day. Here is an interview of Amum from prison:

All of us have been arrested in violation of our constitutional right of peaceful demonstration and marches. Our intention was to present a petition to the members of parliament to enact within these two weeks the Referendum Law on the right of self determination for the people of southern Sudan…Sudan is on the edge of an abyss and we must do everything to preventing it from falling into this abyss of disintegration and chaos…[We are protesting] so that these laws are enacted in conformity with the constitution so that there are freedoms which will ensure that the upcoming elections will be free and fair.

Al-Jazeera reported early this morning that the Sudanese security blocked them from covering the protests and confiscated their tapes.  Fortunately, they captured this footage before being shut down. Our colleague has quickly translated and transcribed two interviews in the footage.  The woman in a white toab(Sudanese national dress), a member of the Umma party, about a third of the way through the video says:

The arrest of the SPLM leaders and members of the Sudanese parliament has proved that there is no freedom in Sudan. This demonstration is peaceful, the people are peaceful. If the government is facing it with this number of military and police forces and with harassment and violence, that means this country doesn’t have freedom, no respect for law and order, no freedom of expression.  This consequently demonstrates the reality that the government is using the force to maintain its seat (in power) and is not allowing any democratic transformation in this country to take place.

After this interview, the man in suit, a member of PCP, asserts:

It’s impossible for the election to take place in an environment dominated by oppression and dictatorship. It’s crucial to change the laws one of which was referenced by the police today to justify their reaction to the protest…because the government’s justification for their reaction is Article 127 of the Sudanese criminal laws that allows the authorities to stop any kind of demonstration or protest even if its peaceful, as well as prohibiting any gathering for delivering statements of protests to the government…The demonstration is calling for the reform and amendment of many laws that were supposed to be amended based on the Sudanese Interim National Constitution.

The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies issued an alert later today about two students detained yesterday around 7:00pm for distributing fliers for Girifna, a campaign for free elections in Sudan:

The security forces chased the two students, firing shots into the air in order to force them to stop. When the students stopped they were arrested. Their instruments, a flute and a bass guitar, were smashed.

One of the students, Mr. Khalifa, was beaten with the butt of a rifle by security agents and was knocked unconscious at the scene. They were then taken to NISS offices near the railway station in Khartoum where they remain in custody without access to lawyers or family. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies fears that they have been subjected to torture.

Available information indicates that these students were targeted for no other reason than that they were attempting to peacefully express their political opinion. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies calls on the government of Sudan to respect the provisions of Article 39(1) of the Sudan Interim National Constitution, which provides that every “citizen shall have an unrestricted right to the freedom of expression, reception and dissemination of information”. The government should immediately release these students unless they can be charged with an internationally recognised criminal offence. At a minimum, the students should be given access to their lawyers and families.

ACJPS also provided these additional details on the crackdown:

Despite the announcement that the intent of the demonstrations was peaceful, authorities released a statement shortly after midnight declaring the demonstration illegal. Heavily armed riot police with batons and tear gas lined the streets of Khartoum in the early morning hours, blocking the roads to Parliament and the main headquarters of several political parties, including the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM). Though the government had announced a public holiday for schools and public employees in an effort to deter the public’s participation, thousands had gathered by morning.

Rubber bullets and tear gas were fired into crowds, and security agents confiscated cameras from international media. In Khartoum, over 250 people were arrested, including prominent lawyers, students, journalists, and parliamentarians. Pagan Amum, the SPLM’s Secretary General, Abbas Jumma, the SPLM Minister of the Interior, and Yasir Arman, the SPLM’s Deputy Secretary General and leader of its Parliamentary block, were all arrested. Mr. Arman was seriously injured in police custody, where 13 security agents took him from his cell to a bathroom and beat him. In total, 42 people so far have been taken to the hospital including Samia Rabih, Hussam Mohamed Alamin, and Muna Eltigani, who was seriously injured and taken to a hospital.

Arrests also took place at similar demonstrations held across Sudan. In Wad Medani and El-Obeid, capital of Northern Kordofan State, 42 individuals were arrested, as were 58 in El Hasahisa. Protests also took place in Port Sudan, Gedaref, Kassala, and El Fasher, as well as in every major city in South Sudan and IDP camps in Darfur. A list of the arrested protestors is available upon request.

In sum, it was a very bad day in Sudan – with ominous signs that things could get a lot worse. And with all of this happening, radio silence from the Obama administration.

To start, the report describes Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in the following unflattering way:

al bashir, his excellency president omar: Al Bashir is the current president of Sudan and head of the National Congress Party. He came to power in a coup in 1989 and has since instituted elements of sharia law throughout the country, including in Christian and animist areas. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for al Bashir in 2009, indicting him on five* counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape) and two counts of war crimes (pillaging and intentionally directing attacks against civilians). *Note: Bashir has been indicted on seven charges.

It also, unsurprisingly, includes the two other Sudanese leaders that have dominated politics and the religious discourse in Sudan for the last four decades:

al turabi, hassan abdallah: Al Turabi is a Sudanese religious leader. He is widely regarded as a moderate and uses Islamic teachings to foster social development. He is an advocate for women’s rights, and believes Muslim fundamentalists place prohibitions above social development. He has recently stated that Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir should give himself up to the International Criminal Court for the sake of Sudan.

al Mahdi, H.E. Imam Sayyed Al Sadiq: Uniquely situated on this list as the single most influential Sudanese leader who derives influence from his lineage—his great grandfather, Muhammad Ahmad, claimed to be the Mahdi, or messianic figure in Islamic eschatology—Imam Sayyed al Sadiq al Mahdi is also Imam of the al Ansar sufi order and president of the moderate Islamic Umma Party.

These short descriptions fail to convey the complex intermingling of politics and religion in Sudan.  In reading them, one would never know that al-Turabi provided al-Bashir with the hard-line Islamist ideology and man-power to overthrow al-Mahdi’s democratically-elected government in 1989.  Labeling al-Turabi as a “moderate” may make sense today as he has recently taken stances that have upset Salafists in Sudan and beyond.  In doing so though, the description ignores al-Turabi’s track record of imposing strict sharia law in Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s and also providing refugee and support to the international jihadist movement – including, of course, inviting Osama bin Laden to use Sudan as a staging ground in the mid-1990s.

As for Darfur, the report highlights the tragedy by including:

osman, salih mahmoud: Salih Mahmoud Osman is a Sudanese lawyer, human rights advocate and a member of the Sudan National Assembly. Listed in European Voice’s 50 most influential people in 2007, Osman also received the 2005 Human Rights Watch Award and the American Bar Association’s 2006 International Human Rights Award.

As I have met Salih on many occasions, I can personally attest to his inspiring commitment to human rights and standing up for the victims in Darfur.  Here is a link to an article that he wrote in The Nation in 2007 on “Justice and Peace in Darfur.”

The other two Sudanese on the list spend most of their time outside of Sudan.  Indeed, I have my strong doubts that they could fully conduct their important work in Khartoum or elsewhere in the country:

ibrahim, dr mohamed ‘mo’: Mohamed Ibrahim—more commonly known as Mo Ibrahim—is a Sudanese-born entrepreneur, currently based in the UK. He became successful as a businessman in the telecommunications industry, founding one of Africa’s biggest cellular phone companies, Celtel. He has recently come to prominence for his idea of a Prize for Achievement in African Leadership—which gives a $5 million initial payment, plus $200,000 a year for life. The Prize was conceived as a way to stop the need for corruption by African leaders, who often resort to corruption to obtain financial security when they leave office, and to promote good governance. The prize is believed to be the world’s largest, surpassing the $1.3m Nobel Peace Prize.

el bashir, his excellency dr issam: El Bashir is the secretary general of the International Moderation Centre (IMC) in Kuwait. The IMC is an organization set up by the Higher Committee for the Promotion of Moderation, of the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of the State of Kuwait to promote Islamic moderation domestically and around the world. The center has worked with communities in Britain and Russia, among other places, to promote moderation among the extremist elements of their Muslim population. Locally it trains over 700 Imams at a time with a focus on practices of moderation.

In my opinion, there are at least two significant individuals that the list could have also included: Lubna Hussein and Yasir Arman. Hussein just entered the domestic political scene in Sudan and grabbed headlines around the world with her public protest over the right to wear pants. While not of the stature of the other individuals, her inclusion could have highlighted the much-neglected topic of women’s roles as leaders in Sudanese society.  Arman as a critical leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) continues to fight in the Sudanese parliament and beyond for the ‘New Sudan’ as envisioned by the SPLM’s founder and visionary, the late John Garang.  Many think that Arman, as a Muslim within the predominantly Christian SPLM, could – if given the chance – help transform Sudanese politics by challenging the entire system through his unique position and message of reform and unity.

Finally, an often overlooked fact about Sudanese politics and society is that the most prominent individuals – such as al-Bashir, al-Turabi, and al-Mahdi – are getting quite old.  While they certainly have plans to hand off their various networks of influence to their predecessors, a seamless transfer is not assured – especially given that so much of their power rests on the public images and personal patronage they have developed over the decades.  The others on the list – as well as Hussein and Arman – however have risen through the ranks of politics, society, and religion largely because of the power of their new ideas and the significance of their more recent accomplishments.  If given the chance to operate in a free society, they would be the ones to help lead Sudan into a more prosperous future.

Zhou Yongkang of the Communist Party of China andSudanese Vice President Ali Osman Tah meet in Khartoum

First posted at Save Darfur…

To close the week, more information on the China/Sudan deal reported first in the Sudanese press and covered here on Wednesday and breaking in the English-language press today.

John Garnaut at The Sydney Morning Herald details the power of security chief Zhou Yongkang who led the Chinese delegation to Sudan.  Garnaut describes the contingent from Beijing as “almost as impressive as Obama’s” and writes:

Zhou could not have made his visit to Sudan without the party leadership considering how it might affect the Obama-Hu Jintao spectacle in Beijing. Ostensibly, however, he and Bashir were simply getting down to business. They unveiled the first Khartoum-Beijing direct flights, opened a Confucius Institute, signed an agriculture agreement and agreed to jointly pump yet more oil.

The article also gives more of the back-story on China’s investments in Sudan:

Back in 1995 Zhou Yongkang was working his way to the top of China’s biggest oil company, Petrochina. He had close connections with another oil industry veteran, Zeng Qinghong, who happened to be a powerbroker for the then president, Jiang Zemin. Zhou and Zeng were the drivers and Jiang was the decision maker behind China’s hugely controversial decision to exploit Sudan’s oil reserves at a time when Western companies could not afford the political or reputation risk, according to several Chinese oil industry and foreign policy sources…This week, Zhou gave a modest account of that personal history.

”Fourteen years ago, then Chinese president Jiang Zemin and you made the strategic decision to start China-Sudan oil co-operation, and our bilateral pragmatic co-operation has since entered a stage of fast development,” Zhou recounted to Bashir, on the delayed CCTV report. Bashir was quick to give Zhou some personal glory.

“You are the important promoter of the Sudan-China oil project, the Sudanese people have special affection towards you,” said Bashir. “Sudan-China oil co-operation not only brought Sudan oil but also peace.”

What is even more troubling than the airtight relationship between China and Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) is the power of the Oil Gang in China – led by Zhou. According to Garnaut, this group has “obstructed efforts by President Hu and others to support international sanctions against Sudan.”

From the outside, it sure looks like Hu has a convenient excuse not to  take any dramatic steps to challenge Khartoum’s deadly policies in Darfur, failure to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and enact true political reforms. Yet, this is the very reason why Save Darfur has urged President Obama not only to use moral suasion with the Chinese but appeal directly to their own national interests: keeping oil freely flowing (something impossible, for example, if war erupts again between the North and South).  This type of realist case for tying incentives for the NCP directly to sustainable peace in Sudan has the real potential to influence even Khartoum’s closest supporters like Mr. Zhou.

Bashir in El-Fasher, Darfur

First posted at Save Darfur’s blog…

President Bashir’s National Congress Party in Sudan is driving for one primary goal: winning the national elections scheduled for April 2010.  All analysis of the NCP’s behavior between now and April should be viewed through this lens.

Bec Hamilton in a blog yesterday sees such motivations behind the NCP’s outrageous suggestion of closing down IDP camps next year:

[T]he NCP sees the 2010 election as a rare chance to start over with a clean the slate in the eyes of its neighbors, if not the broader international community. “Democratically elected Bashir” sounds so much better than “indicted war criminal Bashir.”

But the desire is not just to win the elections (the conditions have already been established such that short of radical changes that I don’t expect to see, I think it’s safe to say they have that one in the bag already). The desire is to be seen as having won them legitimately, which in turn requires convincing anyone who would dare to say otherwise, that the elections will be “free and fair.” The consequences of this desire are seen in several areas, one of which is the aggressive agenda that Khartoum is now pushing on IDP returns.

There is a very real sense in which those in Khartoum view the IDP camps themselves as the problem – as if the camps would disappear, then there would no longer be a “Darfur problem” and the world shift the spotlight. What the regime understands well is that “free and fair elections” and “2.5 million IDPs” are not concepts easily reconciled.

Part of the NCP’s effort, therefore, will be to make the case that the vast majority of Darfuris can participate in the electoral process.  A NCP-leaning newspaper this morning includes the headline, “The Displaced are the highest percentage of registered voters in South Darfur.” The article claims that in 10 days that 388,000 IDPs have registered to vote.  With no election monitors (domestic or international) working in Darfur, no one will be able to confirm or deny these numbers.

Many are also complaining about the registration process in less troubled areas of the country.  During the first days of registration, the Carter Center “expressed concerns about the obstacles facing election observers.” Since then, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the northern opposition parties have all leveled complaints with the National Election Commission concerning the registration procedures and accusations against the NCP of manipulating the entire process.  Their central demands now are an extension of the voter registration period (which currently is schedule to conclude at the end of the month) and greater independent monitoring.

To prevent President Bashir from using fraudulent elections as a means to re-legitimize his regime both domestically and internationally, the U.S. administration must urgently call on the Sudanese government to create the political environment throughout Sudan necessary for free and fair elections to take place.  And as Bec stated in her blog, the administration must also ensure that the return of IDPs in Darfur take place in a manner consistent with the international standards of “voluntary, safe and dignified.”  They cannot be pushed home just to fit the electoral timeline of President Bashir and the NCP.

This week, I have been writing about the African Union Panel on Darfur’s recent report delivered to and endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council.  Having summarized the recommendations that Save Darfur submitted to the panel regarding the peace process, I will now summarize our recommendations for steps that should be taken to address the challenge of justice and the suppression of impunity arising from the conflict in Darfur.

In our submission, we highlighted the AU’s stated will in its founding documents to suppress impunity and ensure justice for mass human rights violations and atrocities.  As such, we urged the AU that “when faced with a choice between the rights of African people and the interests of African states and their leaders, the African Union should stand on the side of the people.”

To make the case for why justice was paramount to tackling the crisis in Darfur, we pointed to recent Sudanese history:

Parties negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the decades-long war between North and South Sudan decided to leave accountability mechanisms out of the accord.  Less than five years later, implementation of the CPA has fallen far behind schedule, violence has increased on border regions, and regional and international leaders have been forced to devote significant energy and resources to upholding the CPA and preventing a return to civil war.  Similarly, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) failed to address the need to end impunity and ensure justice for the victims of the conflict that has raged in Darfur since 2003. This deficiency of the agreement was one major reason for its death on arrival – why it was unable to gain the confidence of the non-signatory rebel movements and much of Darfuri civil society, particularly community leaders in the IDP camps.

Noting the challenges of securing justice for the victims of grave crimes like genocide, while at the same time securing peace, we recommended a two-layered solution.

[F]irst, the pursuit of international justice at the level of the International Criminal Court to end impunity for those most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and second, the construction or reform of local, national and regional justice and reconciliation processes to address atrocity crimes in the future…But any genuine progress in ending impunity and ensuring justice at the national level in Sudan is unlikely at present, and current regional mechanisms are unable to provide justice for crimes in Darfur.   As such, the AU and international community must positively engage with the ICC while reiterating commitments to support the development of genuine accountability processes at national and regional levels.

Disputing the charges that the ICC unfairly targeted Sudan, we reminded the panel that the case of Darfur was referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council due to the absence of capable alternative mechanisms to deal with the grave crimes in Darfur, including any at the national level in Sudan or at regional levels:

• Failed to initiate criminal justice proceedings against individuals responsible for or accused of crimes against humanity or war crimes in Darfur.
• Refused to arrest and turn over those individuals charged by the ICC with crimes in Darfur.
• Refused to heed advice from its friends and allies – such as the League of Arab States – on compromise measures designed to satisfy the need for justice.
• Prevented justice for rape victims in Darfur, despite rampant sexual violence against women and girls in the region.

Specifically we recommended:

• Supporting the Darfur case before the ICC, as it currently provides the only genuine option for holding accountable those most responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur.
• Positive engagement with the ICC.  The AU and all states concerned about peace and justice have the opportunity through positive engagement to enhance the ability of the ICC to play a role in achieving the goals enshrined in the AU Charter.
• Ensuring justice in a future Darfur peace agreement. The Darfur peace process should clearly address the need to end impunity and ensure justice for the victims. Mechanisms must include both criminal justice proceedings to hold perpetrators accountable and complementary restorative justice processes that aid victims and survivors of atrocities and their families and communities.

While the AUPD regrettably did not unequivocally support the Darfur cases currently before the ICC, its report serves as a damning indictment of the Sudanese government’s handling of justice issues in Darfur.  The report highlights a number of the failings summarized above and states “[T]he Panel must…recognise that the victims of the conflict simply have no faith that the justice system of Sudan will be deployed fairly to address the crimes they have suffered.”

The report also notes that ICC’s “prosecutorial policy inevitably leaves the overwhelming majority of individuals outside of the ICC system and still needing to answer for crimes they might have committed.”  It is this reasoning that leads the panel to endorse a Hybrid Court for Darfur “as one component of the architecture for confronting Darfur’s past.”  In essence, the AUPD argues that the ICC should be allowed to function, but more justice is better than less.

We believe, like Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations, that this hybrid court system could theoretically work as a mechanism for accountability complementary to the ICC.  This proposal, however,  cannot be a substitute for or an alternative to the current ICC proceedings.  While some Darfuris, including rebel groups, may rightly presume that some African leaders wish to replace the ICC with the proposed hybrid court system, the Mbeki report does not specifically state this intention.  At this time, there is no evidence to suggest that this concern may be realized.  Instead, as with the Obama administration’s Sudan policy review, the proof will be in the implementation of the AU’s hybrid court recommendations and its continuing work to promote peace, justice and reconciliation for the Darfuri people.