Ultimately, he concludes:

Obama is coming up against the limitations of engagement. What if people around the world want more than a humble adjustment in America’s tone and behavior? What if American overtures to nasty regimes fail, because those regimes have a different view of their own survival? Then the President will have to devise a fallback strategy—preferably one that answers the desires of the people who applauded in Cairo, and doesn’t leave another generation cynical about American promises.

It’s my hope that in analyzing U.S. policy toward Sudan over the last few months that I have appropriately framed the challenges facing the administration. Engagement, even with the likes of the Bashir regime, is the preferred strategy – but it must have limits. Silently acquiescing fully to political violence and oppression not only protects those in power from the  range of influences of American foreign policy and that of our allies, it also undercuts the courageous efforts of reformers within these countries who are daily fighting for change.    

This morning though we must give the administration some deserved credit. Yesterday, it sharply rebuked Egypt’s decision to extend yet again the “emergency law” that grants its security apparatus the right to arrest people without charge, detain prisoners indefinitely, limit freedom of expression and assembly, and maintain a special security court. From the State Department:

Today, the Government of Egypt announced that it is extending the State of Emergency for an additional two years. This extension is regrettable given the pledge made by the government to the Egyptian people in 2005. A broad range of Egyptian voices, including Egypt’s National Council on Human Rights, have called for the elimination of the State of Emergency…We are confident that Egypt can draft and adopt effective counterterrorism legislation that conforms to international standards for civil liberties and due process. And the United States urges Egypt to complete this legislation on an urgent basis and to rescind the State of Emergency within the coming months.

Egypt, as Packer writes, represents an “important test” for the administration’s policy of engagement. The fact that Obama delivered his famous speech to the Muslim world in Cairo makes it symbolic as well. Therefore, let’s applaud the administration for being on the right side of this issue – and then immediately expect even more. As the elections in Egypt near this summer and next year, it will only become more difficult to stand up for basic political and human rights while maintaining appropriate influence with the regime whereby we can convince it to enact gradual, but real change for its people.

In scanning the news on Sudan early this morning, I came across a short item on Radio Dabanga’s website “Two opposition politicians arrested in Nyala” about a government security raid on the local headquarters of two national political parties.  As I wrote in an article at The New Republic today, this type of incident has been fairly common place during the two-month election period in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.

And then I realized that I had actually met one of those detained, Dr. Nour Al Sadiq.  She is currently an appointed member of National Parliament representing the Communist Party.  Along with her party, she chose not to contest the elections in Darfur.  In a few days, therefore, she will lose her seat – and, as these arrests may signal, her limited protection from harassment by the Sudanese regime.

To check up on Dr. Nour—who in addition to her parliamentary responsibilities works with women in internally displaced camps—I called Salih Mahmoud Osman.  Also from Darfur, he serves with Nour in the Parliament as one of two other appointed members from the Communist Party.  Salih has received many awards for his legal and human rights advocacy since the beginning of the crisis in Darfur, and for these efforts endured a prolonged period of detention in 2004.

From Khartoum, Salih confirmed the arrests and that the security agents stormed their office in Nyala yesterday and seized documents and computers. It seems that the authorities targeted her and the other leader, Abdul Rahman Ahmed Hassan of the Umma Party for Reform and Renewal, for signing a statement with others this week urging Darfuris to not participate in the elections. Fortunately after four hours, Nour was released, but only after repeated threats and intimidation to stop these activities.

In our conversation, Salih expressed his profound frustration with current US policy toward Sudan. He said, “People are really really sad and they are asking themselves why President Obama and his administration have set such low standards for the elections.” When I asked him about the US Special Envoy’s last minute efforts to salvage the elections after a number of parties announced their boycotts, Salih brushed them aside saying, “He has lost the respect of most individuals in Sudan – except for maybe the National Congress Party [Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir’s ruling party].”

Salih, Nour and others right now fear what will come after the elections. In the week before the polls open, they have heard rhetoric from NCP leaders like Nafie Ali Nafie that begin to reveal the regime’s plans for a new painful chapter in Darfur and Sudan.  At a rally this week, Nafie declared that overall participation of Darfuris in the election process will be high, and stated (article in Arabic):

“Darfuris will vote for the NCP to express their special relationship to the Salvation [the name for the Revolution of Salvation that seized power via military coup in 1989],” adding that Darfuris have sent clear signals to those trying to target the project of Sudan and the Salvation.

Nafie also promised the crowd that “Darfur will find salvation after an NCP victory.”

Perhaps what Nafie means by ‘salvation’ is what the International Crisis Group just predicted for post-election Darfur:

[T]he consequences for Darfur are catastrophic. Disenfranchising large numbers of people will only further marginalize them. Since the vote will impose illegitimate officials through rigged polls, they will be left with little or no hope of a peaceful change in the status quo, and many can be expected to look to rebel groups to fight and win back their lost rights and lands.

In addition, the report notes how “[w]inning big is…central to the NCP’s hopes of capturing enough votes in northern Sudan to ensure its continued national dominance.” It documents the numerous ways the NCP has cooked the books to achieve this objective.

The delusions of Nafie and the harassment yesterday of Nour and Abdul Rahman paint a bleak picture for Darfur and the rest of Sudan after the elections. It is clear that despite all of their protestations to the contrary the NCP and the Bashir regime have not changed.  It is therefore vital that President Obama see these elections for what they really are: just a new device to maintain control across Sudan and avoid real peacemaking in Darfur.

Time to Take Away Sudan’s Credit Card

Sudanese officials are heading to Washington in search of a bailout. But the Obama administration should condition its support on an improvement in the country’s dismal human rights record.

Omar al-Bashir’s brutal Sudanese regime certainly has nerve. On Dec. 14, as Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) thugs violently suppressed the second peaceful demonstration by opposition groups in seven days, the Sudanese minister of finance met with the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration and urged the United States to lift sanctions on Khartoum and cancel Sudan’s foreign debt — in other words, bailing out the government that brought you such atrocities as Darfur and the decades-long civil war with South Sudan that now ominously threatens to reignite.

While no Western country is rushing to hand out money to Bashir, the international community has disagreed over how to persuade Sudan to end its genocidal ways, and the United States is still the only country to impose sanctions. One unlooked-for upside of the global financial crisis may be that it offers new economic leverage with Khartoum. Following the crash, Sudan now holds roughly $36 billion in external sovereign debt that it is struggling to repay. This debt gives the rest of the world a new opportunity to finally affect the course of Sudanese political reform and even end the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan, if Western countries are willing to act boldly (Read the rest here).

On Tuesday, I attended a talk in Washington on “Engaging on Human Rights in the Middle East: Multilateral Frameworks and the Role of the U.S.” organized by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Boll Foundation.  The event focused on the ways in which multilateral frameworks work to promote or to inhibit human rights reforms in the Middle East, including the techniques authoritarian regimes employ to undermine the effectiveness of multilateral organizations.

Moataz El Fegiery, Executive Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, spoke about the Arab League’s strategies and tactics to protect the violations of its members before the UNHRC, as well as other human rights bodies.  On Sudan, he discussed how the Arab and African blocs and other countries have consistently sought to restrict the mandate and block reports from UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan. Fortunately these countries lost a major battle in June when the UNHRC members – over the objections of the many African and Arab countries – voted to appoint an independent expert on the situation in Sudan.

In his comments, Joe Stork, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Division ofHuman Rights Watch, attempted to assess the Obama Administration’s record on human rights in its first eight months in office.  He noted that those driving American foreign policy have said the right things in regards to the importance of promoting human rights.  Specifically, he referenced Obama’s speech in Cairo and UN Ambassador Susan Rice’s recent speech at New York University.  Overall though, he said that “It’s too soon to tell” whether this rhetoric will actually translate into actual policies.

To follow up on this early assessment, I asked Stork during the question and answer period how advocates should evaluate success on the human rights front in the context of the Obama Administration’s engagement-first approach to foreign policy.  As we have seen, engaging with a regime like Sudan’s may mean pushing for gradual change over time despite the existence of grave human rights abuses today in places like Darfur.

Stork responded by saying that in his opinion engagement should always be the default position.  Therefore, he supports Obama’s preference for dialogue before confrontation.  At the same time, he acknowledged that the U.S. bilateral relations with any country will involve a complicated and competing set of interests and priorities – and human rights usually is not a first order concern.  His general advice, therefore, for American foreign policymakers is to choose the one or two most important human rights issues to push aggressively on in their negotiations with odious regimes.

Should we apply Stork’s advice to Sudan?

Whereas human rights have seemed so far to be one cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s engagement on Sudan, there is no doubt that many issues (such as regional stability and combating terrorism to name only two) factor into Sudanese-American relations as well.  From experience though, we also know that pushing for policies to change the behavior of the Bashir regime falls low on the U.S. priority list in its bilateral relations with other countries who possess significant leverage (see, for example, where Sudan fell on the agenda for the meeting between Mubarak and Obama two weeks ago, or the U.S.-China Summit in July).  As advocates for peace and human rights in Sudan, we must continue to demand that human rights issues in Darfur and throughout Sudan take center stage in America’s engagement of Sudanese leaders.  For guidance on the key issues in Darfur today, Bec Hamilton has written a good piece after just returning from Sudan. We must also keep demanding that the U.S. make human rights a higher priority in its relations with regional powerhouses like Egypt and South Africa, as well as global powers like China.

The U.S. should also ensure that non-strategic partners have support in their efforts to promote and protect human rights at home and abroad.  Countries like Zambia and Botswana have played an important role in advocating for justice in Darfur, with the former voting for the UNHRC independent expert in June and the latter objecting publicly in July to the African Union’s opposition to the ICC proceedings on Darfur.  With several other African cases at the ICC and ongoing efforts to promote justice across Africa and the Middle East, Obama’s approach to Sudan serves furthermore as both signal and strategy for dealing with other complex cases in an increasingly multi-polar world that still often looks to the U.S. for leadership.

It’s my belief that the Obama Administration can amplify its engagement efforts with Khartoum by putting peace, protection and human rights not only at the centerpiece of its relations with Sudan, but also making some of its specific concerns about the Sudanese regime’s egregious behavior a higher priority with others.  This does not mean that Darfur or Sudan should be the first priority when speaking to the Egyptians or Chinese, but even raising it to the top five or top ten could go a long way in building a coherent multilateral approach to ensure Sudanese leaders feel the necessary pressure to take the critical steps to end human rights abuses and resolve the country’s interlocking crises.