Also posted at Save Darfur…

Yesterday, at the end of the first full day after the crackdown in Khartoum, the State Department finally released its statement condemning the violence used against protesters in Sudan. Calling for restraint and dialogue among all parties, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, stated:

“I am deeply concerned about these developments and urge all parties to exercise restraint. Negotiations on issues of urgent importance to all of the Sudanese people cannot proceed in an atmosphere of intimidation.”

SPLM leader Yassir Arman arguing with police

SPLM leader Yassir Arman arguing with police

Today, at the end of the second day, we have the following to report.  First, the Juba alliance announced that it would not hold another demonstration tomorrow, but would postpone the effort until next Monday, December 14.  Sudanese newspapers this morning also reported that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would meet today with Sudan’s First Vice President and leader of the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM) Salva Kiir to discuss Monday’s events and to seek solutions on overcoming the roadblocks in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

As for the political climate in Khartoum and much of the rest of the country, it remains tense.  Al-Sahafa reports that the Sudan Scholars Authority (Muslim scholars) issued a fatwa (a religious decision) prohibiting Muslims from joining demonstrations organized by the “enemies of Islam” and that the government is entitled to prevent sedition and chaos in the country. The opposition mocked this fatwa and considered it as clearly a propaganda item of the National Congress Party (in Arabic). Afrik.com also has a story claiming that five Ugandan businessmen were killed during the violent clashes between the police and protesters in the Southern Sudanese town of Rumbek. And despite a number of claims by observers and participants, police in Khartoum again denied that they used teargas on Monday against the protestors. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Journalist Network called for an investigation of detentions of and alleged abuses against five reports – including the confiscation of their tape recorders – during the demonstration.

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Protests in Sudan Today

Protests in Sudan Today

First posted at Save Darfur…

Omar al-Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) failed another test today of their commitment to holding free and fair elections in Sudan scheduled for April 2010.  Responding to a march (see video here of crowds chanting “Freedom, Peace and Security”) planned by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and northern opposition parties, the Sudanese security forces violently quashed the demonstration and arrested a number of Sudanese politicians and activists.  We have been compiling information throughout the day.

The following is a run down and here is also a collection of pictures.

Amnesty International confirms that over 200 people, including opposition leaders and human rights activists, were arrested at the demonstration. It demanded that Sudanese authorities announce the names and whereabouts of those arrested and either charge them with recognized criminal offenses or release them immediately:

“This is yet another example of the culture of violence that the Sudanese government has adopted,” said Tawanda Hondora, deputy director of the Africa program at Amnesty International. “The government must respect the right of protesters to peacefully assemble and express their views. This is a crucial time for Sudan and all parties should abstain from using violence, especially in the light of the coming elections and referendum.”

Two of the leading members of the SPLM, Pagan Amum and Yasir Arman, were among those arrested. Our sources tell us that Arman was beaten severely by a group of police officers before being taken to the hospital.  Both men are now free. The children and grandchildren of Sudanese opposition leaders Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma Party) and Hassan al-Turabi (Popular Congress Party) were also detained during the day. Here is an interview of Amum from prison:

All of us have been arrested in violation of our constitutional right of peaceful demonstration and marches. Our intention was to present a petition to the members of parliament to enact within these two weeks the Referendum Law on the right of self determination for the people of southern Sudan…Sudan is on the edge of an abyss and we must do everything to preventing it from falling into this abyss of disintegration and chaos…[We are protesting] so that these laws are enacted in conformity with the constitution so that there are freedoms which will ensure that the upcoming elections will be free and fair.

Al-Jazeera reported early this morning that the Sudanese security blocked them from covering the protests and confiscated their tapes.  Fortunately, they captured this footage before being shut down. Our colleague has quickly translated and transcribed two interviews in the footage.  The woman in a white toab(Sudanese national dress), a member of the Umma party, about a third of the way through the video says:

The arrest of the SPLM leaders and members of the Sudanese parliament has proved that there is no freedom in Sudan. This demonstration is peaceful, the people are peaceful. If the government is facing it with this number of military and police forces and with harassment and violence, that means this country doesn’t have freedom, no respect for law and order, no freedom of expression.  This consequently demonstrates the reality that the government is using the force to maintain its seat (in power) and is not allowing any democratic transformation in this country to take place.

After this interview, the man in suit, a member of PCP, asserts:

It’s impossible for the election to take place in an environment dominated by oppression and dictatorship. It’s crucial to change the laws one of which was referenced by the police today to justify their reaction to the protest…because the government’s justification for their reaction is Article 127 of the Sudanese criminal laws that allows the authorities to stop any kind of demonstration or protest even if its peaceful, as well as prohibiting any gathering for delivering statements of protests to the government…The demonstration is calling for the reform and amendment of many laws that were supposed to be amended based on the Sudanese Interim National Constitution.

Protestors Detained Today
Protestors Detained Today

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3176023310_804902c3f8First posted at Save Darfur…

Are African countries that are state parties to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court playing a shell game with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir?  Since the issuance of his arrest warrant by the ICC in March 2009, Bashir has repeatedly received invitations from African leaders to attend summits and conferences that eventually result in the dispatching of non-fugitives of international justice to serve in Bashir’s stead.  Were these recent invitations from countries like Uganda and Nigeria in good faith?  Or have there been pre-arranged deals cut that a public invitation would be extended with the understanding that Bashir would not accept them?

Last week provides the most recent example of a possibly well-choreographed diplomatic dance.  On Thursday, Amnesty International broke the news that the African Union had invited Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to participate in the AU Peace and Security Council meetings on Darfur in Abuja, Nigeria.  They urged the AU to rescind the invitation and, if Bashir made the visit, the Nigerian government “to arrest President Omar al Bashir and hand him over to the ICC.”  After a day of headlines and ambivalent statements from Nigerian and AU officials about their commitments to fulfill obligations under international law, the Sudanese government announced on Friday that Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha would lead Sudan’s delegation to the AU meetings.

But it’s not just international or Western human rights groups that are offended by the invitations issued by African capitals.  Last week, an uproar on the matter occurred for the second time this year in Uganda before Bashir turned down an invitation to attend the Special Summit of Heads of State and Government on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.  The Sudanese government eventually sent only two junior officials in a pattern of events that closely mirrored another Ugandan invitation in July.  At that time, a senior Ugandan foreign affairs official told Reuters:

“The invitation still stands … (but) we will handle it through diplomatic channels to avoid embarrassment and inconvenience to anybody…It’s a codeword for an agreement that President Bashir delegates another senior cabinet-ranked person. That was agreed.”

Likewise, the Nigerian based NEXT online news portal quoted “reliable diplomatic sources” in Abuja as saying that the government does not want to break ranks with the AU yet seeks to fulfill international obligation:

“My reasoning is that [the] government is merely inviting Sudan as a country with a veiled message that someone higher in the Sudanese government but not Bashir would be the welcomed guest,” said the source.

What would be the motivations behind such deals? By extending the invitations to Bashir, these governments can play to a vociferous current in pan-African politics that rejects the ICC proceedings on Darfur and case against Bashir.  In July, the AU approved a resolution to abstain from cooperation with the ICC over extraditing Bashir.  Many at the time complained that such a resolution was pushed unfairly by Libyan leader Colonel Muamar Gaddafi. Yet by going along with the resolution, many African leaders have placed themselves in a position where in order to reflect African solidarity and preserve the legitimacy of an AU decision purportedly made on behalf of the entire continent, they must make decisions regarding Bashir that may lack support amongst their own constituencies. By reaching pre-arranged deals with Bashir that he will not take up their invitations, these countries could be craftily avoiding the full weight of international pressure calling for their enforcement of international law.

In the cases of Uganda and Nigeria, what is ‘good’ for the AU does not seem to translate necessarily into what is in the national interest, as expressed by local civil society and media.  For instance, Nigerian human rights groups have said that they would protest any visit by Bashir. “The invitation is an insensitive display by the president of Nigeria,” said Innocent Chukwuma, head of the CLEEN Foundation.

As for President Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP), the invitations from other African heads of state send the public message that the Sudanese president still retains legitimacy in the eyes of his continental counterparts.  It helps, furthermore, Bashir and the NCP make the case domestically that the president can still carry out the full function of his responsibilities – a matter questioned by some within the NCP since the issuance of the arrest warrants.  In fact, Bashir and the party’s chief interlocutor with the international community, Ghazi Salah Al-Deen, in a moment of honesty acknowledged last month that the court’s decision is “limiting the movement of the president…He has to study of course any particular (travel plan) on its own merits.”

All of this diplomacy is testing whether a head of state can effectively perform his functions while wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant. Are these countries really ignoring the decision of the ICC, or are they diplomatically circumventing it in order to avoid acting in what may be their own national interest?  Countries are parties to the ICC because they have determined, independently of the AU, that its presence serves a warranted and legitimate role in the promotion and protection of international law. Some, including Uganda, have openly acknowledged the potential role of the Court in addressing their own crises.

Even if these countries know that Bashir will pass on their invitations, Nigeria and Uganda degrade the force of public condemnation and isolation that the ICC arrest warrants have had on President Bashir and the NCP.  Of course, the stances of these countries are better than non-ICC members like Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea that have welcomed and hosted Bashir.  Yet these countries should be clear about their commitments to fulfill international law and follow the lead of South Africa and Botswana. If it turns out that they are intentionally playing such a shell game with Bashir, they must realize that they are directly weakening the efforts of those within Sudan fighting to make Bashir’s arrest warrant – and inability to perform his position – an important issue in the upcoming national elections.

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In an interesting development yesterday, all the major political groups in Sudan showed a moment of “rare unity in welcoming [the] US policy.” The Save Darfur Coalition and other groups also welcomed the administration’s emphasis on a balance of incentives and disincentives for peacemaking in Sudan – but stressed that implementation would be critical to the policy’s success.

This unusual moment of cohesion demonstrates why effective implementation of the American plan will be paramount in achieving the objectives set out in the policy review. When all sides praise your plan, despite having contradictory interests and motives, you must realize that your work has only just begun.  What will shape these actors long-term interpretation of the Obama administration’s policy are not the principles or strategies found in the review, but the very next steps in the engagement process.

For instance, Sudanese presidential adviser Ghazi Salah Al-Deen told the Sudanese news agency that the lack of any reference to military intervention “is important” and that the plan constitutes a “new spirit” for the Obama administration.  At the same time though, he criticized the administration’s description of Darfur as a “genocide” and said that the Sudanese government would not respond to a “policy of pressure” which it considers disrespectful and reflects “old mindsets” that found their way into the policy review (article in Arabic).  The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) deputy secretary-general Anne Itto remarked simply: “The policy is in line with the SPLM position.”

As for the Darfuri rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur hailed the affirmation of the “genocide” label for the Darfur conflict and said that the administration’s calls for “conflict suspension and providing security to civilians” were completely in line with the SLM position.  However, he then criticized the efforts of Gration thus far stating that the special envoy had turned these principles “upside down” by making “genocide legitimate” (presumably by engaging with Sudanese officials) and “creating new [rebel] groups.”  A spokesperson for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) also said the policy “show[s] a good direction to resolve the conflict,” but then urged Washington to realize that Khartoum only want to buy time and lacks “the will to achieve peace.”  The spokesperson concluded: “The US must press Khartoum to respond positively to genuine international will looking to bring peace.”

Of course, Gration and the administration will make critical decisions soon that upend this consensus about the tone and substance of American policy toward Sudan.  All parties have expressed a desire for U.S. leadership, but they have different expectations and fears regarding what American engagement actually means.  From the first day of implementation (today!), Gration and others in the administration must remain clear about their intentions and objectives – as well as their expectations for Sudan’s leaders.

Such an approach will mean that the United States immediately:

  • Holds the Sudanese government accountable for ongoing human rights abuses in Darfur – such as its refusal to acknowledge the widespread incidences of rape, its obstruction of the provision of humanitarian assistance and the full unhindered deployment of UNAMID, and the use of disproportionate force by the Sudanese Armed Forces
  • Pressures the National Congress Party to create an atmosphere suitable to holding free and fair elections, and then make public the measures by which the administration will judge the credibility of elections
  • Pushes the National Congress Party to pass critical pieces of legislation pertaining to the national security laws, freedom of press, freedom of association, and the 2011 referendum
  • Condemns the Sudanese government’s ongoing harassment of Sudanese human rights defenders
  • Urges the Government of South Sudan to tackle potentially explosive corruption issues and to coordinate with UNMIS to enhance police and SPLA capacity to ensure civilian protection
  • Encourages the Darfuri rebel movements to adopt a unified negotiating stance for upcoming talks that includes a role for civil society representatives, including women

Emergencies and crises will arise in the next few months that will fully test the administration’s commitment to its stated policies of resolving Darfur and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  By taking the above steps now, the U.S. can assure all sides of the seriousness and substance of its policy – and, equally important, it can clearly demonstrate what is expected of Sudan’s leaders as the country and its people wrestle with the significant challenges before it.

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Cross posted from SSRC’s Making Sense of Darfur blog

Mr. Badawi in his recent post “Indebted to the Save Darfur Coalition?” plays loose with the numbers and the definition of Sudan’s “odious” debt. In addition, he mischaracterizes the objectives of the Save Darfur Coalition’s position related to how the international community should deal with Sudan’s debt crisis and ignores the coalition’s support thus far of the Obama Administration’s engagement strategy with Khartoum.  We have repeatedly called for the U.S. to offer Sudan’s leaders with a choice between earned incentives for durable peace and escalating costs to those who obstruct efforts to resolve Sudan’s interlocking crises.  It is necessary, as Mr. Badawi argues, for the international community to rid the Sudanese people of this burdensome and “odious” debt accumulated by multiple regimes in Khartoum – but the burden of proof first lies with Sudan’s leaders to demonstrate that they have finally committed to extinguishing the flames of decades of conflict in Sudan.

To begin with the facts, Mr. Badawi is just plain wrong when he states that the “explosion [in debt] has been almost solely [due] to a build-up of repayment arrears to bilateral and multilateral creditors.” From 1989 until today, the Sudanese government has received an estimated $4 billion in new public medium and long-term loans and an estimated $5 billion in new private medium and long-term loans (information via Economist Intelligence Unit, a past employer of Mr. Badawi).  Much of this new debt is even more recent.  Sudan accumulated over $2 billion in new loans from international lenders (almost half of it from non-Paris Club bilateral loans) between 2001 and 2006 when it was still waging war in south Sudan and orchestrating its campaign of death and destruction in Darfur. In 2007 and 2008 alone, Sudan contracted another $1.444 billion in more loans mostly from Arab multilateral and non-Paris club creditors, as well as from China and India.

This data reveals that many in the international community continued to give to the Sudanese regime while it was waging war and genocide against its own people.  Sudan’s arrears certainly did balloon during this period by $12 billion to bring its total arrears to $18 billion (half of its estimated debt load of $36 billion), but NIF/NCP leaders also contracted new irresponsible loans to finance their destructive policies.  From their own reporting,Sudan imported weapons worth $76.3 million between 2004 and 2006, not including fighter jets and combat aircraft.  The cost of Sudan’s purchase of 20 MiG-29s and 26 attack helicopters from 2004 to 2008 is unknown but most experts conservatively estimate the price-tag at hundreds of millions of dollars.  Recent reports, furthermore, allege that this advanced military buildup continues.

These figures lead me to Mr. Badawi’s second slight of hand.  While designating the Nimeiri regime’s debt as “odious,” he shows absolutely no willingness to apply the same standards to President Bashir’s twenty-year old regime. Any amount of intellectual honesty should have led him to consider this $9 billion in new loans as “odious” as well.  This financing certainly did not go to improve the lot of the war-battered Southern Sudanese and Darfuris over the last two decades.  In making the case for immediate debt-relief for Sudan, Mr. Badawi argues that “the pattern of inequitable development in Darfur, south Sudan, and other areas of the ‘periphery’… lies at the heart of Sudan’s history of instability.”  With that said, his argumentation implies that such marginalization was a product purely of the Nimeiri regime – certainly an absurd historical account given that the civil war with the SPLA escalated in the years after the 1989 coup and such marginalization was a chief motivation of the Beja rebellion that began in the late 1990s and the Darfuri rebellion in 2003.

It is also questionable whether the vast majority of northern Sudanese have seen their conditions improve.  Their political rights, as consistently protested by northern opposition parties and democracy and human rights activists, continue to be severely curtailed.  Last week, in fact, the Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance ranked Sudan 49th out of 54 countries, noting that Sudan “scored well below the continental average in the categories of Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights and Sustainable Economic Opportunity.” And even on strictly economic grounds, Sudan has not yet met the pre-conditions for theHeavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  Most notably, the Sudanese government has yet to complete its National Poverty Reduction Strategy paper in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Given its track record, the current Sudanese government should not be surprised that advocates for peace and human rights in Sudan fail to take their argument about being unfairly burdened with Nimeiri’s debt and the related arrears seriously. President Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi took direct ownership of this debt when they carried out their unconstitutional coup in 1989 and usurped all vestiges of state power. Flouting the international community, they ignored the arrears that piled up as they instituted their reign of terror in the 1990s.  Bashir and the NCP then, as shown above, have used billions in new loans this decade to finance not only crucial infrastructure for the new oil economy – but continuing repression, civil war, and even genocide.

Severely affected by the global financial crisis, the Sudanese government currently seeks assistance from the international community to avoid a financial meltdown.  Recent hubris underpinned by the Khartoum-boom now makes way for urgent appeals for debt-relief. Save Darfur’s campaign intends to remind the international community of the odious character of this debt contracted by a regime that remains in power and continues to obstruct peacemaking efforts in Darfur and the democratic transformation set forth in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  International financiers should not subsidize the continuation of such policies, orchestrated by a government with an indicted war criminal at its head, that are leading the country toward even further chaos and ruin.

Save Darfur has also begun educating American policymakers and Sudan’s other major creditors on the real opportunity that debt-relief provides to incentivize peacemaking in Sudan in a multilateral, coordinated manner.  Of course, it’s useful for those defending the Sudanese government, in the name of “ordinary” Sudanese people, to treat Save Darfur’s advocacy (for this specific initiative and in general) as a simplistic campaign to punish those in power in Khartoum.  It’s also useful for these writers to conflate activist campaigns like “Fast the Eid” – to which Save Darfur had no relation – with the serious policy proposals put forward by the organization.

Mr. Badawi’s description of Save Darfur fundamentally mischaracterizes the coalition’s approach to the Obama Administration’s engagement strategy. Up until now, we have supported the active efforts of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General Scott Gration to revive the constantly-adrift Darfur peace process and to help facilitate the ongoing negotiations surrounding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  In fact, we have urged Gration to do even more to help create space, opportunities, and incentives for Sudanese to solve their own problems, such as sponsoring civil society mechanisms for non-combatants to participate in the Darfur negotiations.

With Sudan at a dangerous crossroads, we have consistently called for President Obama to present those in power in Khartoum with a choice between earned incentives or serious consequences.  To that end, the U.S. should put forward a clear but conditioned process toward normalization of relations with Sudan if, and only if, the government of Sudan provably: permits unrestricted humanitarian access; secures peace in Darfur; fully implements the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; ensures free and fair elections throughout Sudan; and removes the president who is a fugitive from justice.  On the other hand, the U.S. should make clear to President Bashir and his party that if they renege on humanitarian commitments and continue to undermine efforts at peace, escalating costs will ensue.

With this strategic approach to providing incentives and disincentives to those in power in Khartoum, the Obama Administration should utilize the ready-made multilateral stick/carrot of debt-relief.  Mr. Badawi chose to ignore the political conditions that Save Darfur has set out for the provision of debt-relief to Sudan.  In our public statements, we have said that if the government demonstrably changes its behavior to the benefit of all of Sudan’s people,the U.S. should lead the way in facilitating a debt-relief package for Sudan with the international community.  On the other hand, if the Sudanese government fails to match its rhetoric for peace with proven action, then the U.S. should make it clear to Sudan that it will use its role at the IMF, as well as its position in the Paris Club, to block any potential debt-relief package.  The American message should be simple: the international community will not help Sudan with its economic crisis unless the Sudanese regime takes concrete and lasting steps to resolve Darfur, implement the CPA, and enact true reform to the benefit of its citizens.

These are the internal political solutions – outlined most recently by a cross-section of Sudanese political parties in the Juba Declaration – which the Obama Administration must support in its engagement with the Sudanese government.  Indeed, these should be the parameters for – as Alex de Waal writes – “a more constructive political and economic engagement with Sudan, precisely because that will help shift the political centre of gravity in Sudan away from the sterile military/militaristic polarization to a civil-political process that nurtures democracy.” Without first achieving these political solutions and implementing these reforms, debt-relief now for Sudan would give unearned incentives to a regime that has shown no clear and demonstrable signs of finally kicking its murderous and odious ways.

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First published at Save Darfur’s blog…

On Tuesday, I attended a talk in Washington on “Engaging on Human Rights in the Middle East: Multilateral Frameworks and the Role of the U.S.” organized by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Boll Foundation.  The event focused on the ways in which multilateral frameworks work to promote or to inhibit human rights reforms in the Middle East, including the techniques authoritarian regimes employ to undermine the effectiveness of multilateral organizations.

Moataz El Fegiery, Executive Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, spoke about the Arab League’s strategies and tactics to protect the violations of its members before the UNHRC, as well as other human rights bodies.  On Sudan, he discussed how the Arab and African blocs and other countries have consistently sought to restrict the mandate and block reports from UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan. Fortunately these countries lost a major battle in June when the UNHRC members – over the objections of the many African and Arab countries – voted to appoint an independent expert on the situation in Sudan.

In his comments, Joe Stork, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Division ofHuman Rights Watch, attempted to assess the Obama Administration’s record on human rights in its first eight months in office.  He noted that those driving American foreign policy have said the right things in regards to the importance of promoting human rights.  Specifically, he referenced Obama’s speech in Cairo and UN Ambassador Susan Rice’s recent speech at New York University.  Overall though, he said that “It’s too soon to tell” whether this rhetoric will actually translate into actual policies.

To follow up on this early assessment, I asked Stork during the question and answer period how advocates should evaluate success on the human rights front in the context of the Obama Administration’s engagement-first approach to foreign policy.  As we have seen, engaging with a regime like Sudan’s may mean pushing for gradual change over time despite the existence of grave human rights abuses today in places like Darfur.

Stork responded by saying that in his opinion engagement should always be the default position.  Therefore, he supports Obama’s preference for dialogue before confrontation.  At the same time, he acknowledged that the U.S. bilateral relations with any country will involve a complicated and competing set of interests and priorities – and human rights usually is not a first order concern.  His general advice, therefore, for American foreign policymakers is to choose the one or two most important human rights issues to push aggressively on in their negotiations with odious regimes.

Should we apply Stork’s advice to Sudan?

Whereas human rights have seemed so far to be one cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s engagement on Sudan, there is no doubt that many issues (such as regional stability and combating terrorism to name only two) factor into Sudanese-American relations as well.  From experience though, we also know that pushing for policies to change the behavior of the Bashir regime falls low on the U.S. priority list in its bilateral relations with other countries who possess significant leverage (see, for example, where Sudan fell on the agenda for the meeting between Mubarak and Obama two weeks ago, or the U.S.-China Summit in July).  As advocates for peace and human rights in Sudan, we must continue to demand that human rights issues in Darfur and throughout Sudan take center stage in America’s engagement of Sudanese leaders.  For guidance on the key issues in Darfur today, Bec Hamilton has written a good piece after just returning from Sudan. We must also keep demanding that the U.S. make human rights a higher priority in its relations with regional powerhouses like Egypt and South Africa, as well as global powers like China.

The U.S. should also ensure that non-strategic partners have support in their efforts to promote and protect human rights at home and abroad.  Countries like Zambia and Botswana have played an important role in advocating for justice in Darfur, with the former voting for the UNHRC independent expert in June and the latter objecting publicly in July to the African Union’s opposition to the ICC proceedings on Darfur.  With several other African cases at the ICC and ongoing efforts to promote justice across Africa and the Middle East, Obama’s approach to Sudan serves furthermore as both signal and strategy for dealing with other complex cases in an increasingly multi-polar world that still often looks to the U.S. for leadership.

It’s my belief that the Obama Administration can amplify its engagement efforts with Khartoum by putting peace, protection and human rights not only at the centerpiece of its relations with Sudan, but also making some of its specific concerns about the Sudanese regime’s egregious behavior a higher priority with others.  This does not mean that Darfur or Sudan should be the first priority when speaking to the Egyptians or Chinese, but even raising it to the top five or top ten could go a long way in building a coherent multilateral approach to ensure Sudanese leaders feel the necessary pressure to take the critical steps to end human rights abuses and resolve the country’s interlocking crises.

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