Sudan’s Dangerous Trajectory

A new military offensive in Darfur, the arrest of political leaders, and the shutting down of newspapers in Khartoum: election season must be over in Sudan. Emboldened by electoral “success,” Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP) are sending troubling signals about their philosophy that will guide post-election governance.

The push last Friday by the Sudanese Armed Forces to regain control over a stronghold of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in West Darfur kicked off seven days of violence and repression. The army reported that it killed 108 JEM fighters in the assault. Elsewhere in Darfur, JEM allegedly attacked a tanker truck killing 20 Sudanese police officers. Continued clashes between nomadic tribes and the kidnapping of humanitarian aid workers – including an American – have only heightened tensions throughout Darfur.

Commenting yesterday on these recent developments before the United Nations Security Council, the Joint Special Representative for the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) stated that continued fighting in Darfur has “caused substantial civilian casualties, the displacement of communities, and hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” The U.S. State Department earlier in the week also condemned the “recent offensive actions in Darfur” and “urged both the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebel movements to refrain from any further actions that would undermine the Darfur peace process or endanger civilians.”

Yet, blithely ignoring the deteriorating conditions in Darfur, an NCP leader told Darfuri students this week that his party was seeking to deepen peace and foster a culture of national unity (article in Arabic). Most people in Darfur instead fear that the faltering peace process, government offensive, and continuing crisis in Jebel Marra proffer a new post-election reality.

Critics and opposition leaders in Khartoum share such concerns…

Read the rest here

Also, two nights ago I spoke with WSCOC-TV out of Charlotte, North Carolina about the kidnapping of three aid workers – one of them American – in Darfur with the organization Samaritan’s Purse which is based in Boone, NC. Today, I heard that the two Sudanese men kidnapped were released, but the American woman remains held hostage.

Workers For Boone-Based Charity Kidnapped In Africa

BOONE, N.C. — Samaritan’s Purse, based in Boone, said three of its workers were kidnapped at gunpoint Tuesday in the Darfur region of Sudan.

Evangelist Franklin Graham, CEO of Samaritan’s Purse, said he’s in contact with the U.S. and Sudanese governments and is seeking their help in securing the safe return of the workers — a woman from California and two Sudanese men.

The three were in a two-vehicle convoy and were confronted by a group of armed men, according to a statement from the charity.

Channel 9 spoke with a senior policy analyst for the Save Darfur Coalition Tuesday, who said kidnappings have become more common in the region.

“The last two years have been the most dangerous for aid workers in Darfur than at any time since the genocide in Darfur began in 2003,” Sean Brooks said.

Samaritan’s Purse says it has provided $83.7 million in assistance to Sudan over the past decade.

Yesterday, I highlighted the recommendations of Somali experts – notably Bronwyn E. Bruton and Ken Menkhaus – for how the United States should contribute to counter-terrorism, conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, economic development and state-building in Somalia.  Their pragmatic and cautious approaches argue against knee-jerk American responses to the real or perceived threats posed by al-Qaeda, the al-Shabab, and piracy.

Last spring at SAIS, I put together an extensive backgrounder on Somalia. The paper traces the  history of state formation in Somalia from the colonial period to the collapse of the state and its current crises. At the end, I provide a brief analysis of the current challenges to peace-making and state-building placed in their historical context – something missing from much of the current writings on Somalia. I must confess that much of my understanding of Somalia has been influenced by Menkhaus, my former advisor.  In reading Bruton great piece in Foreign Affairs, I also found that her recommendations closely match the findings that I developed. So if you are interested, enjoy…

Introduction

The five points on the star of the light-blue Somali flag proclaim a nation’s dream deferred. The predominantly nomadic Somalis met the era of nationalism and independence with high hopes. They and observers of the time saw a “well-defined geographic and ethnic unit…as a natural base for a sovereign state.” Ethiopia and the colonial powers, however, had different visions for the boundaries of a Somali state. Three points of the star – Djibouti, the Ogaden (in Ethiopia), and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya – were stripped from the Somalis before the official birth of the Somali nation. The subsequent experiments with democracy and ‘scientific socialism’ attempted to develop a modern state and in some ways rebuild a forcibly contracted national consciousness. These processes ultimately failed and led to the collapse of the state in 1991. What emerged in replace of the state were still uncongealed fragments of a dismembered nation. For external and internal reasons, Somali leaders until this day have not found a means to unite these disparate and usually warring pieces.

Final Analysis

Emerging from a dismembering birth at independence, Somali elites have constantly attempted to breed irredentist nationalism to legitimize their control of the state. The early politics of democracy challenged each government to push a hard line on securing the stripped Somali lands of French Somaliland, the Ethiopian Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier in Kenya; former dictator Siad Barre could not concede the right of self-determination for the Ogaden Somalis in the late 1970s; and most recently the Islamic Court Union (ICU) could not muzzle threats against Ethiopia long enough to consolidate and defend their military and political successes in 2006.

Why do the elites retreat to this expansionist Somali nationalism each time in the face of clearly stronger neighbors? The answer may be that little else has thus far shown a capacity to forge a national consciousness across the real economic and social cleavages of Somali society. In addition to clan divisions, the rural/urban divide has shaped Somali politics for centuries as seen in the ebb and flow of power between the coastland to the hinterland. In the beginning of his regime, Barre recognized the importance of improving the agricultural sector, but the implementation of ‘scientific socialism,’ a product mostly of cold war convenience, could not begin to address the growing gaps between urban and rural populations. Then in the 1980s, the regime used state resources to inflame cleavages between various Somali communities.  As such, there were no defenders of the state when it collapsed and, likewise, no foreign agents to blame as a means of rallying Somali nationalism to revive the state.

Islam presents a more indigenously suited alternative, as it can be easily conflated with Somali nationalism and has shown the ability to bridge both rural/urban and clan divisions. The slow rise of Islamic activism and the ascendancy of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) demonstrate its cross-cutting mobilizing utility in Somali politics. Nevertheless, the ICU eventually encountered the common problem of clan division, with certain groups effectively characterizing it as Hawiye-dominated. The success of Islamic activism in Mogadishu, however, pales in comparison to the regional solutions that have endured in Somaliland and to a lesser extent in Puntland.

What the success of the ICU and Somaliland have in common, however, is that they are at their base Somali-derived solutions that depart in some key way from current Western models of governance. Yet, these accomplishments have been virtually unacceptable from the point of view of regional and international powers. Ethiopia views both an Islamist-oriented government in Somalia and greater autonomy or independence in Somaliland as threats to its national security.International actors also obviously fear the rise of an Islamist government in Somalia and want to avoid the division of Somalia into smaller units for fear of the encouragement that such a development would give minority groups in other countries, especially Africa. Despite these internationally imposed constraints on state-building in Somalia, the international community paradoxically continues to demand a state from the warring parties.

If such is still the objective, the process of national reconciliation and state formation must derive from Somali-driven processes. As theorized by as diverse an array of scholars as Ibn Khaldun and Francis Fukuyuma, social cohesiveness (or capital) and trust are key components in the formation of society and the building of a state. By all measures, these bonds have broken down in Somalia today. As such, Somalis have relied almost exclusively on their familial connections. This outcome is a result of a state that intentionally destroyed cross-cutting societal linkages in the 1980s – a process that began during the period of colonial partition. International intervention has only inflamed differences more and done nothing to rebuild trust among Somali political actors. Still both Ken Menkhaus and Peter Little have written about the “malleability of interests” even within the clan system in Somali society. They point to the way that the clan system has adapted to “the changing demands of the international community as well as to the challenges of statelessness and pastoralism.”  Little provocatively asks, “Is it surprising then that Somali clans began to fracture and/or consolidate along sub-clan and lineage lines when external agencies worked within a clan idiom themselves?”

In order then to identify the true interests of each constituency and search for a workable compromise, it is necessary to remove the foreign influences as much as possible. The involvement of the United States, Ethiopia, Egypt, Eritrea, and even the United Nations are inherently distorting to Somali politics.  As such, Menkhaus encourages the new Obama administration to seek “[p]olicies which privilege Somali-driven processes, rely mainly on Somali interests and actors to drive outcomes, and respect Somali preferences.” Were Somalis able to take control of the process in this way, perhaps finally as Samatar advised in 1988 “moral and intellectual commitments from leading classes” could emerge to take charge of the state and the economy. Western countries though must realize that in the current Somali political climate some solutions – such as regionalism or elements of Islamist governance – may emerge. It must accept, therefore, these outcomes and then support the new-born Somali state in making the central government and its governing mechanisms mean more to the Somali people than a threatening source of predation.

Heavily armed men in Somalia

The United States Institute of Peace held a talk yesterday focusing on “International Engagement with Somalia.” Bronwyn E. Bruton of the Council on Foreign Relations and Abukar Arman, an independent policy analyst originally from Somalia, addressed the immensely complicated topic of how the United States and its international partners should approach the interlocking and enduring political, security, and humanitarian crises in Somalia.

In his remarks, Arman emphasized the need for a “paradigm shift” in policymaking by highlighting the colossal mistakes of recent American policies toward Somalia. While he gave general recommendations for a new blueprint, he failed to outline in a systematic way any real contours for this new approach.

Given the shortage of viable national leaders, bottom-up governance strategies might appear to be a solution to Somalia’s messy, perpetually shifting decentralized politics. For instance, the experience of the ICU, which brought unparalleled stability to an unruly Mogadishu almost overnight in 2006, is instructive…Such arrangements,although admittedly fragile, have emerged in the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The best of them depend on local, rather than international, resources to deliver economic growth and other concrete benefits to the public and respect relations among clan and religious leaders, business groups, and civil society

On Tuesday, I attended a talk in Washington on “Engaging on Human Rights in the Middle East: Multilateral Frameworks and the Role of the U.S.” organized by the Project on Middle East Democracy and the Heinrich Boll Foundation.  The event focused on the ways in which multilateral frameworks work to promote or to inhibit human rights reforms in the Middle East, including the techniques authoritarian regimes employ to undermine the effectiveness of multilateral organizations.

Moataz El Fegiery, Executive Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, spoke about the Arab League’s strategies and tactics to protect the violations of its members before the UNHRC, as well as other human rights bodies.  On Sudan, he discussed how the Arab and African blocs and other countries have consistently sought to restrict the mandate and block reports from UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan. Fortunately these countries lost a major battle in June when the UNHRC members – over the objections of the many African and Arab countries – voted to appoint an independent expert on the situation in Sudan.

In his comments, Joe Stork, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Division ofHuman Rights Watch, attempted to assess the Obama Administration’s record on human rights in its first eight months in office.  He noted that those driving American foreign policy have said the right things in regards to the importance of promoting human rights.  Specifically, he referenced Obama’s speech in Cairo and UN Ambassador Susan Rice’s recent speech at New York University.  Overall though, he said that “It’s too soon to tell” whether this rhetoric will actually translate into actual policies.

To follow up on this early assessment, I asked Stork during the question and answer period how advocates should evaluate success on the human rights front in the context of the Obama Administration’s engagement-first approach to foreign policy.  As we have seen, engaging with a regime like Sudan’s may mean pushing for gradual change over time despite the existence of grave human rights abuses today in places like Darfur.

Stork responded by saying that in his opinion engagement should always be the default position.  Therefore, he supports Obama’s preference for dialogue before confrontation.  At the same time, he acknowledged that the U.S. bilateral relations with any country will involve a complicated and competing set of interests and priorities – and human rights usually is not a first order concern.  His general advice, therefore, for American foreign policymakers is to choose the one or two most important human rights issues to push aggressively on in their negotiations with odious regimes.

Should we apply Stork’s advice to Sudan?

Whereas human rights have seemed so far to be one cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s engagement on Sudan, there is no doubt that many issues (such as regional stability and combating terrorism to name only two) factor into Sudanese-American relations as well.  From experience though, we also know that pushing for policies to change the behavior of the Bashir regime falls low on the U.S. priority list in its bilateral relations with other countries who possess significant leverage (see, for example, where Sudan fell on the agenda for the meeting between Mubarak and Obama two weeks ago, or the U.S.-China Summit in July).  As advocates for peace and human rights in Sudan, we must continue to demand that human rights issues in Darfur and throughout Sudan take center stage in America’s engagement of Sudanese leaders.  For guidance on the key issues in Darfur today, Bec Hamilton has written a good piece after just returning from Sudan. We must also keep demanding that the U.S. make human rights a higher priority in its relations with regional powerhouses like Egypt and South Africa, as well as global powers like China.

The U.S. should also ensure that non-strategic partners have support in their efforts to promote and protect human rights at home and abroad.  Countries like Zambia and Botswana have played an important role in advocating for justice in Darfur, with the former voting for the UNHRC independent expert in June and the latter objecting publicly in July to the African Union’s opposition to the ICC proceedings on Darfur.  With several other African cases at the ICC and ongoing efforts to promote justice across Africa and the Middle East, Obama’s approach to Sudan serves furthermore as both signal and strategy for dealing with other complex cases in an increasingly multi-polar world that still often looks to the U.S. for leadership.

It’s my belief that the Obama Administration can amplify its engagement efforts with Khartoum by putting peace, protection and human rights not only at the centerpiece of its relations with Sudan, but also making some of its specific concerns about the Sudanese regime’s egregious behavior a higher priority with others.  This does not mean that Darfur or Sudan should be the first priority when speaking to the Egyptians or Chinese, but even raising it to the top five or top ten could go a long way in building a coherent multilateral approach to ensure Sudanese leaders feel the necessary pressure to take the critical steps to end human rights abuses and resolve the country’s interlocking crises.