A blog about the politics and conflicts of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and the role of the United States in facilitating peacemaking, state-building and economic development in the region.
Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Egypt on Sunday to begin an important weeklong trip to Africa. Before his departure from Washington, the Save Darfur Coalition sent Mr. Biden an urgent appeal to make the dangerous situations in Sudan a top priority during his scheduled meetings with Egyptian, Kenyan, and South African leaders.
These three African powerhouse countries all have a stake in the future of Sudan. As neighbors, Egypt and Kenya would feel the direct impact of increased instability throughout the country, and especially the renewal of the North/South war. Egypt’s primary concern is the free flow of the Nile, although like Kenya it also fears a flood of refugees that would flee any new conflict. On the other hand, in the event that the Southern Sudanese choose independence next January in the referendum, Cairo and Nairobi could also reap considerable benefits from a peaceful separation. Investors in both countries, for example, are eyeing attractive business opportunities in a newly sovereign South Sudan that will be built from the ground up.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Egypt and Kenya have long played a role in regional peacemaking efforts to resolve Sudan’s decades of conflict. As a leading country within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (a seven-country regional development organization for East Africa), Kenya provided the chief mediator and critical political support to the negotiations that resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 between the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). During the North/South civil war, Egypt also attempted to broker talks and allowed both the SPLA/M and northern opposition to meet regularly in Cairo. As a continental diplomatic powerhouse, South Africa also consistently pressed both sides to end the war, and now South Africa chairs the AU Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in the Sudan (PCRD) and former South African President Thabo Mbeki now leads the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan.
While all three countries have sought to help Sudanese handle their recurring crises at different times in the past, not all of their contributions have been positive, nor coordinated. Most recently, Egypt has allegedly obstructed progress in the Darfur peace talks in Doha out of envy that the Qataris were taking the lead in the negotiations. With a declared preference for unity rather than separation, Egyptian officials have also sent mixed signals about whether they will recognize the results of the referendum. The situation of tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees living in Egypt has also grown more precarious as Egyptian security have at times arbitrarily harassed, detained and threatened refugees with illegal deportation.
George Packer in The New Yorker has a short, but punchy, analysis of the “rights and wrongs” of the first year of Obama’s international engagement of both friends and enemies. As an ardent supporter from the beginning of this strategy, I think it’s important that we constantly assess its strengths and weaknesses. Packer discusses the early reluctance of the administration to risk rebuilding strained relationships abroad by prioritizing democracy or human rights. He credits Obama though for consistently offering a vision of hope in his speeches to citizens living in oppressive conditions, as well as with some innovative initiatives sponsored by the administration to give concrete outlets for uplift.
Ultimately, he concludes:
Obama is coming up against the limitations of engagement. What if people around the world want more than a humble adjustment in America’s tone and behavior? What if American overtures to nasty regimes fail, because those regimes have a different view of their own survival? Then the President will have to devise a fallback strategy—preferably one that answers the desires of the people who applauded in Cairo, and doesn’t leave another generation cynical about American promises.
It’s my hope that in analyzing U.S. policy toward Sudan over the last few months that I have appropriately framed the challenges facing the administration. Engagement, even with the likes of the Bashir regime, is the preferred strategy – but it must have limits. Silently acquiescing fully to political violence and oppression not only protects those in power from the range of influences of American foreign policy and that of our allies, it also undercuts the courageous efforts of reformers within these countries who are daily fighting for change.
World Refugee Day Celebration; Cairo, Egypt (2005)
The elections in Sudan are understandably grabbing all of the headlines this week. The National Election Commission today extended voting for two days because of the widespread confusion and delays in the electoral process. The opposition parties boycotting the elections also directly attacked U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, as the head of the Carter Center’s election monitoring team, for their support of these elections. It is their claim that the Obama administration has made a deal with Omar Al Bashir’s government to support fraudulent elections in exchange for the referendum of southern secession in January 2011. At Save Darfur, we have put together a full summary of the election-related developments.
Tonight though, I wanted to take a brief moment to highlight another human rights issue: the status of refugees in Egypt. The treatment and daily life of refugees – mostly from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan – has never been easy. I know this from a year spent volunteering as an English teacher at a refugee center, Saint Andrews, in downtown Cairo. Due to these daily hardships, over the past few years, a number of refugees have attempted to travel to the Sinai peninsula and enter Israel illegally. In some instances, Egyptian security forces have shot at and killed refugees making the crossing, and the Israeli authorities have also violated the rights guaranteed to refugees.
Why am I writing about this tonight? Because at least two Darfuris in Egypt are at immediate risk of forcible return to Sudan. Amnesty International issued a warning on Friday that the authorities planned to return Sudanese refugees Mohamed Adam Abdallah and Ishaq Fadl Dafallah to Sudan today, April 12. If returned, Amnesty warned that they would be in grave danger of being tortured or otherwise ill-treated in Sudan.
Some good articles and blog posts on issues covered recently here at Brains Like a Shoe.
On Darfur, Alex de Waal takes on the chatter among some Darfuris about self-determination. He discusses the various arguments in support of self-determination in the context of current Sudanese politics. And this week in the medical journal The Lancet researchers concluded that about 300,000 people died over the past six years in Darfur, but that disease, rather than violence, killed at least 80 percent of them. This is probably the most reliable mortality study to date. I am sure people like Mahmood Mamdani will make as much hay as they can with this study to argue that the conflict in Darfur has been exaggerated by activists. He and others will no doubt in the process conveniently ignore the fact that roughly 3 million Darfuris fled the violence and still remain in displaced camps.
On Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood elected its new leader this week amid reports of much internal dissent. The Economist has a good summary of what the elections mean for the Brotherhood and Egypt. Meanwhile, last week the Project on Middle East Democracy held an event on Capitol Hill to assess the Obama Administration’s first year. A prominent Egyptian blogger, Bassem Samir, provided a pessimistic account of the situation in Egypt, reflecting upon his recent arrest and detainment for 30 hours in advance of his flight to the United States. In explaining prospects for reform, he posed the question, “What do [Egyptians] want?” He answered, “We want Egypt to be better by ourselves, not by others – but we need help.”
that about 300,000 people died, but that disease, rather than violence, killed at least 80 percent of them.
On the United Arab Emirates, The New York Times ran a more analytical than normal piece on the now crumbling image of the Emirates as an Arab model of modernity: “Then the crash came and revealed how paper-thin that image was, political and financial analyst. That realization, not just in Dubai but also in Abu Dhabi, the oil-rich capital of the United Arab Emirates, has cast a harsh light on an opaque, top-down decision-making process, not just in business but in matters of crime and punishment as well, political and financial analysts said.”
And here are some quick recommendations of other interesting pieces:
Marc Lynch on the controversial politics of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the most influential satellite mufti: “Hate him or love him, the man has a keen sense of Arab opinion — whether he’s following or leading it — and has a proven track record of driving the debate.”
This scoop came from Safwat El-Sherif, the Secretary General of Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and the Chairman of the Egyptian Shura Council. El-Sherif made these comments to a delegation of visiting Sudanese journalists in Cairo. He also stressed that Egypt views Sudan as its “strategic depth” and, as such, the country will spare no efforts to keep Sudan unified, strong, safe and secure.
What does this mean concerning Egypt’s response to a vote for southern secession in 2011? Well, probably not much, since first El-Sherif does not really make foreign policy and second Egypt has been sending mixed signals for months. At times, officials have said they would support southern independence and at other times they have hedged on such support. The debate about what to do in Cairo is likely still ongoing, given its importance to Egyptian national security.
However, El-Sherif’s interesting justification for a unified Sudan was only matched by his description of the wall that Egypt is building on its border with Gaza and his explanation of the current press freedoms in Egypt.
On unity: A generation was brought up on a love for Sudan and the unity of the Nile Valley. Such a generation believes in the unity of the Nile Valley and went out into the streets for it.
In fact, Sudanese chose independence in 1956. Sudanese leaders have often criticized Egypt’s intrusive foreign policy that seems to forget often this historical and political reality.
On Palestine: There is no wall of steel, but actions of the armed forces to protect Egypt’s national security…We are free to choose the way we protect our national security.
In fact, the wall is made of super-strength steel says the BBC and Egypt has been complicit with Israel in the humanitarian blockade of Gaza.
On Freedoms: Egypt is experiencing unprecedented levels of freedom of opinion and expression, and it has allowed freedoms unprecedented in other Arab countries.
I am unusually struck by the lack of good news in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. So before I list the stories on human rights violations, civil conflict, and war that grabbed my attention, lets begin with two stories that could – if spun skillfully – seem like positive developments.
First, Mike Smith at Dipnote (the State Department’s blog) discusses how peacekeeping offers new opportunities for U.S.-China relations. In the long-run, greater Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping seems like it could help fill critical capacity gaps – and if China would do this in coordination with the United States so much the better. With such a bright horizon, we will therefore today focus on China’s commitment of engineers to the UN/African Union hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – and not its diplomatic and military support of the Khartoum regime.
As for the other encouraging item, Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch argues that “a spate of recent international judicial actions is nipping at heels of the some of the world’s most powerful states and suggesting that although a culture of impunity persists, getting off scot-free is little by little on the wan.” This article helps confront the recent rhetoric by some governments and academics that the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other mechanisms of international justice are new tools of western imperialism. The ICC prosecutor’s interest in crimes committed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the recent Goldstone report help undermine this claim. I would also add the British court’s surprise arrest warrant for Israeli former foreign minister Tzipi Livni to the list.
But now to the news that is difficult to put in a positive light.
What an interesting week. I was not able to blog on much of it, but here is what I was reading:
It’s not just Sudan…more on China in Africa: The New York Times highlights political implications of a Chinese scholarship program for Namibia’s elite; China and Senegal hope to enhance military cooperation; and at the Globalist, two authors convincingly argue that “China is currently pursuing oil resources in unstable countries without regard for the political risk entailed. While that might play well in the short- to medium-term, it could cost China dearly down the line.”
It’s not just China increasing influence in Africa: Saudi Arabia held the first meeting of the Saudi-East Africa Forum in Addis Ababa this week. Representatives from seven East African countries attended: Ethiopia, Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda. A Saudi minister stated, “Saudi Arabia is committed to combating hunger, to provide support for the host country but also to generate exports. We are not to impose our needs above the needs of local population.” Sudan did not participate in the forum; however, the Saudi Development Fund announced this week that it was donating 15 million dollars for development and rehabilitation in Darfur. The money will go to the “model villages” that the Arab League has pushed as an effort to help IDPs in Darfur return to normal lives.
Whither Yemen? Thats the title of a good blog summarizing the current challenges facing Yemen’s leadership. It concludes that “the period ahead for Yemen is likely to be, to paraphrase Hobbes, ‘nasty and brutish.’” Another blog challenges the notion that Saudi Arabia’s recent intervention in Yemen’s conflict with the Houthi rebels could be good for the US because it will lead to the further militarization of the Gulf and a strong Sunni and Gulf alliance against Iranian encroachment throughout the Arab world. Ian Bremmer at Foreign Policy tends to agree that greater militarization and more proxy wars are usually not constructive anywhere and argues that a failed state next to the world’s largest oil exporter is reason enough for Americans to care about the conflict.
First, The Sudan Tribune has a bit more from Zhou Yongkang, the Chinese security chief, who led the delegation to Sudan this week and about whom I blogged yesterday. After his meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, he showered the man wanted on seven charges at the International Criminal Court with the following praise:
“As an old friend of the Sudanese president, I got a full sense of the profound changes that have taken place in Sudan under your leadership as soon as I stepped on Sudanese soil…This morning I visited the Khartoum Oil Refinery. Ten years ago it was a mere construction site. Today it is covered with one modern plant after another.”
Second, two leading Sudanese papers (Al-Rai Al-Aam and Al-Sahafa) this morning lead with stories about the aftermath of the Egypt-Algeria match on Wednesday. Stating that President Hosni Mubarak thanked Bashir for the efforts of the Sudanese security, the articles try to put to rest rumors of new tensions between the Egyptians and Sudanese. The articles also claim that at least 10 Algerian fans are being held in Khartoum and will face charges in Sudanese courts for their assaults on Egyptian fans after the game.
Soccer is more than just a sport for Egyptians. A recent victory in a do-or-die match against Algeria has captivated the entire nation, as well as Western observers. The LA Times blog Babylon and Beyond describes how Egypt “wishes for soccer glory as compensation to tough living.” The blog quotes sociologist Sayed Eweis, who explains soccer “is something that makes [Egyptians] happy.” Writing in The Guardian, Mohamed El Dahshan elaborates that soccer “acts as a catharsis for political frustration and a proxy for popular participation” in Egypt.
I also forgot to mention yesterday that Egypt’s win on Saturday forced a “sudden death” World Cup qualifying match that will be held tomorrow in, of all places, Khartoum. A blogger at The New York Times highlights the irony:
In Sudan, there is a love-hate relationship with Egypt, and there will be a huge number of Algerian supporters on hand Wednesday for the World Cup playoff game between the Pharaohs and the Desert Foxes. You have to wonder why Egypt chose this country to host the game, with a place in South Africa on the line.
The Sudanese papers this morning covered the extensive security arrangements being made and reported on the scores of planes being chartered from both Algiers and Cairo. The Telegraph reports:
“We expect 48 aircraft from Algeria and 18 from Egypt,” said Khartoum state governor Abdelrahman al-Khidr, noting about 2,000 Egyptians were also expected to take buses, while thousands already lived and worked in Khartoum.
For tomorrow though, lets put politics aside for 90 minutes, hope for a great game (meaning an Egyptian victory), and of course a day free of violence. Yalla Masr!
Having lived in Cairo and watched intense national rivalry games on small television sets at dusty coffee shops in dark alleys surrounded by over-caffeinated and over-zealous young men, I can picture perfectly the scene Hannah Allam describes:
Fireworks are exploding, police sirens are blaring, horns are honking, music is thumping and at least six processions of young men with drums have passed noisily in front of my building. Sporadic gunfire is keeping the whole block’s residents in from their balconies.
Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Egyptians are flooding the streets draped in the red, white and black of the national flag and generally whooping it up. They have reason to celebrate: the Egyptian national soccer team beat archrival Algeria tonight in a World Cup qualifier. The two teams will play again Wednesday in Sudan.
“This is what a revolution could look like,” an Egyptian friend observed, wistfully, of the fervor in the streets.
With a completely calcified political scene, football serves as one of the only outlets for national pride and competitive domestic politics in Egypt. Elections for the position of president of the two main Cairo clubs - Al-Ahly and Zamalek – are more hotly contested than any government position in the country.
Imagine what the pent up frustration of millions of young Egyptians could do if focused on a political target? Perhaps Gamal Mubarak? Could this happen if Hosni suddenly passes away or, if before that, he unconstitutionally attempts to hand over power to his son? Given the police state that is modern-day Egypt, this revolution en masse may never take place. But no one knows for sure until the fortitude of the carefully calibrated system of repression is truly tested.
Creating this blog gave me the opportunity to add مخ زي جزمة - "mokh zay gazma" - to the internet archives. A google search demonstrates that no one has transliterated this Egyptian Colloquial Arabic expression into English in the same way that I have. The term literally means "brains like a shoe" and in Egypt it is a derogatory term used to describe someone who is extremely stubborn. The role of intransigence and the dearth of creativity for new solutions should be clear to all those who track developments in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. This blog intends to comment regularly on these politics and the role of an often sadly, stale America foreign policy in supporting peacekmaking, state-building, and economic development in these closely linked volatile regions.
