George Packer in The New Yorker has a short, but punchy, analysis of the “rights and wrongs” of the first year of Obama’s international engagement of both friends and enemies. As an ardent supporter from the beginning of this strategy, I think it’s important that we constantly assess its strengths and weaknesses. Packer discusses the early reluctance of the administration to risk rebuilding strained relationships abroad by prioritizing democracy or human rights. He credits Obama though for consistently offering a vision of hope in his speeches to citizens living in oppressive conditions, as well as with some innovative initiatives sponsored by the administration to give concrete outlets for uplift.
Ultimately, he concludes:
Obama is coming up against the limitations of engagement. What if people around the world want more than a humble adjustment in America’s tone and behavior? What if American overtures to nasty regimes fail, because those regimes have a different view of their own survival? Then the President will have to devise a fallback strategy—preferably one that answers the desires of the people who applauded in Cairo, and doesn’t leave another generation cynical about American promises.
It’s my hope that in analyzing U.S. policy toward Sudan over the last few months that I have appropriately framed the challenges facing the administration. Engagement, even with the likes of the Bashir regime, is the preferred strategy – but it must have limits. Silently acquiescing fully to political violence and oppression not only protects those in power from the range of influences of American foreign policy and that of our allies, it also undercuts the courageous efforts of reformers within these countries who are daily fighting for change.
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