Brains Like a Shoe

The great team at the Progressive Policy Institute published my assessment of the Sudan elections.  In the policy memo, I call upon President Obama to follow through on his inaugural promise to autocrats around the world:

In his inaugural address, President Obama declared, “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” Unfortunately, in the case of Sudan, the hand remains extended, even as the fist remains clenched and poised to strike….It is not too late for President Obama to hold firm to his inaugural promise and declare his administration’s disapproval of politics as usual in Sudan. When the election results are announced this week, he can lead the international community in interpreting their significance. Rather than offering unearned praise, he should state that the administration still regards Bashir as an indicted war criminal on the wrong side of history. If the U.S. fails to stand up for its principles, advocates for democracy around the world will be disheartened, the Bashir government will continue to act with impunity, and the Sudanese people will lose faith in America, even as they face an uncertain and potentially dangerous future. (Read the rest of “Khartoum Dispatch: Assessing the Sudan Elections”)

Good timing for the report to be issued, as the administration’s response has been taking shape over the last 24 hours. My colleague, Robert Lawrence, provides a summary in our election roundup at Save Darfur. In short, the administration denounced the elections as neither free, nor fail – without assigning real blame to any actors in Sudan. The elections apparently were stolen by themselves.

In a short post today, I also reflect on what this means for politics going forward in Sudan over at Change.org:

The elections in Sudan over the last week have given rise to the broadest and most public debate about the governance of the country since before the 1989 coup that brought Omar Al-Bashir and his regime to power. Opposition parties, civil society organizations, and a nascent youth movement have participated loudly in the process — despite ever-present threats of intimidation and repression. These important elements of Sudanese society seized on the first openings of political space, even if many used the opportunity to boycott and denounce the electoral process…

A return, therefore, to purely autocratic politics may not be entirely possible. The chances, however, are more likely in the event that the Obama administration and others in the international community whitewash these elections and explicitly or implicitly confer legitimacy on the Bashir regime.

In response to this line of reasoning, James Traub at Foreign Policy writes on the Obama administration’s handling of the elections, and the advocacy community’s reaction to the administration’s overall policy of engagement. He asks some very relevant questions, such as: will engagement prove more effective this time than it did in the past?

After mildly critiquing the positions of Save Darfur and others for not being nuanced enough, he concludes:

Things could be different this time around. Just as pushing the “reset button” with Russia might have produced an atmosphere more conducive to arm-control talks that the Russians already saw as in their own interest, so the soft line on Sudan may make it easier for Bashir to accept what he already recognizes is inevitable. Does that mean the international community had to let him manipulate the election as he saw fit? No; I think the world could have, and should have, pushed him harder. And Bashir must always be aware that the ICC indictment is a very real Sword of Damocles hanging over his head. But he needs to feel that he can survive partition in order to accept it. Bashir does not deserve to survive, of course; he deserves to spend the rest of his life behind bars. But we will not help Sudan if we insist on treating him and his regime as they deserve.

There is of course a lot of logic to this argument. The main point, however, that I think Traub and many others have missed is that the possible secession of South Sudan next year – that which, he argues, Bashir must “accept” – is not the only game in town in Sudan. No matter the results of the referendum, seventy percent of the country will remain controlled by a small, unrepresentative clique that refuses to loosen their firm grip on the country. This imbalance of power will keep Darfur unresolved and perhaps lead to conflicts elsewhere in Sudan, and perhaps even with a newly sovereign southern neighbor. To “help Sudan” therefore, the Obama team must ensure that engagement convinces Bashir to stop repressing the Sudanese people and to open up political space – and not simply to allow the South escape.