Brains Like a Shoe

Its been a crazy last two weeks, so my blogging schedule has been curtailed…but here is an attempt to get back on the horse.  Just a few items of interest…

Waq-al-Waq has “the scariest thing you will read today”: that Yemeni are now asking al-Qaeda to teach in their schools because of a lack of teachers.

… if al-Qaeda in Yemen ever turned itself into a positive organization, by which I mean an organization that could be for something instead of only against things, if it could provide services and be a force for good in people’s daily lives in Yemen then its growth potential would be nearly unlimited. I have always added the caveat to that statement that there was no evidence to support the idea that AQAP was looking to go that way, and this is a pretty flimsy piece of evidence but it is still evidence. Whether it is a one-off item or a precursor is impossible for me to know, even with my magic 8-ball.

The always insightful Hannah Allam based in Cairo and Baghdad has a great piece on Beyonce versus the world famous Egyptologist Zahi Hawass.

In the Darfur file, Ethiopia announced that it would send 5 long-awaited attack helicopters to Darfur.  This is good for the UNAMID force and helps Ethiopia’s already stellar image in the eyes of the West.  Such moves are one reason why the international community, as the Sahel Blog explains, ignores the repressive politics at home.

Bec Hamilton writes about Save Darfur’s partnership with the State Department this week to launch AskUS — a web 2.0 initiative to connect the Obama administration with citizen activists.  Jerry Fowler asked a number of incisive questions to the US Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration.

Finally, Khalid Nur responding to a post by Alex de Waal at Making Sense of Darfur provides a good summary of the coverage of the Mbeki report in the Sudanese press.  His analysis matches up with my own scouring of the Sudanese newspapers everyday:

Thumbing through the papers this is what I find. On 25 October Sadiq al-Riziqi who is the owner of Al-Intibaha the most strident paper against the SPLA and the Darfurians, rejected the Panel and especially the hybrid courts proposal. Al-Riziqi is exceptionally well informed about the goings on in the inner circles but he has his own views too. For the ordinary citizens of Sudan, al-Riziqi’s rejection is a good endorsement! But read the same paper three days later and we see a columnist hinting that if the procedures in the hybrid courts are correctly done then the NCP will accept.

This is pretty much the double line taken by other well-known columnists too. Ahmad Al-Sharif (Al-Watan) lambasts Mbeki’s report as targeting national sovereignty and going beyond its mandate by putting into question the competence of the Sudanese judiciary. Kamil Idriss (formerly of the World Intellectual Property Organisation) in Al-Sudani, says that the idea of hybrid courts strike to the heart of the credibility of the Sudanese judiciary and is a humiliation. But read carefully what others are writing. One government spokesman, writing in Al-Ahdaf on 1 November, says that ICC Prosecutor’s welcome of the Panel’s proposal for hybrid courts should be bracketed: any mechanism set up in the wake of the AU decision will proceed without reference to the ICC. That is a way of setting the Mbeki recommendations apart from the joined-up three pillar process that the ICC is helping to set up in Kenya. In the Kenyan case, the ICC is joined at the hip to the hybrid courts and so also to the local courts, but this isn’t the case for the Darfur proposal. And most interesting, the leading Islamist Tayib Zain Al-Abdeen, writing in Al-Sahafa on 2 November advised the NCP to accept the hybrid courts proposal, saying that its own failure to prosecute anybody gives it no credibility to object, and it also cannot accuse the African Union of being a colonial conspirator.

One of the best commentaries was done by Khalid al-Tijani, for Al-Sahafa. He put his finger on the government’s basic dilemma. On the one hand, Khartoum cannot reject the Mbeki Report because any such action will threaten the cohesive African stance supporting Khartoum’s position on the ICC, while on the other hand the acceptance of the report would equally conflict with the latter’s principled rejection of the intervention of the ICC. This puts the front men for the government policy in an awkward situation and luckily the two men in question, Ghazi Salah Al-Din and Ali Osman Muhammed Taha are able to exercise self-restraint and avoid either outright acceptance or outright rejection, playing the game of watering down the recommendations in the implementation stage.